University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2009

The Nanny Corporation and the Market for Paternalism
M. Todd Henderson
dangelolawlib+mtoddhenderson@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
M. Todd Henderson, "The Nanny Corporation and the Market for Paternalism" (John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 456, 2009).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 456
(2D SERIES)

The Nanny Corporation and the Market
for Paternalism
M. Todd Henderson

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
February 2009
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

DRAFT: Please do not cite or circulate without permission.
The Nanny Corporation and the Market for Paternalism
M. Todd Henderson
“Men want to putter around their homes;
Mr. Pullman insisted on doing the puttering himself.”1
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Michigan-based Weyco Inc. told employees who smoked that
they had 15 months to quit, and when four employees refused to submit to a
breath test, the firm fired them.2 The logic behind Weyco’s decision is simple—
firms bear some of the costs of individuals smoking (including higher health
insurance costs, lower productivity, increased absenteeism, etc.) and therefore
have an incentive to reduce these costs. Or, looking at it another way, employees
who smoke raise the costs for the other stakeholders in the corporation: other
employees pay higher insurance premiums or accept lower wages than they
otherwise would, shareholders see lower returns, creditors are at increased risk,
and so on. In economic terms, the firm is forcing employees to internalize the
negative externalities they impose on other claimants of firm value. Weyco’s chief
executive summarized this rationale nicely: “I pay the bills around here. So I’m
going to set the expectations.”3
Weyco is not alone. Numerous other firms are increasingly setting
standards for employee conduct (beyond prescribing illegal conduct) that
interfere with what seemed in the past to be private decisions, since they were
made in places or at times (for example, at home) that were beyond the reach of
employer monitoring and even law. Some firms even go so far as to send
inspectors to employee homes to check compliance of employees and their
families with firm-specified health and behavior guidelines. All of these
paternalistic actions are motivated by firm desires to reduce costs, mostly health
care costs, for which employers are bearing an increasingly large burden.
Several academic accounts of corporate nannyism exist,4 but in analyzing
these programs piecemeal and from a rights-based approach5 (viewing corporate
1

Ida M. Tarbell describing the paternalism of George Pullman in his eponymous company town,
Pullman, Illinois, quoted in John S. Garner, Introduction, in JOHN S. GARNER, ED., THE COMPANY TOWN:
ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE 7 (1992).
2
Marisa Schultz et al., “Workers fume as firms ban smoking at home,” Detroit News, Jan. 27, 2005,
available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/business/0501/27/A01-71823.htm.
3
Interview with Morley Safer on 60 Minutes (?), transcript available at
http://www.thetechzone.com/forums/showthread.php?referrerid=8876&threadid=86321.
4
See, for example, Karen Chadwick, Is Leisure-Time Smoking a Valid Employment Consideration, 70
ALB. L. REV. 117 (2006); Terry Dworkin, It's My Life - Leave Me Alone: Off the Job Employee
Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47 (1997); Lewis Maltby and Bernard Dushman, Whose
Life Is It Anyway -- Employer Control of Off-Duty Behavior, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 645 (1994);
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efforts as intrusive and negative), they miss the most important aspect of the rise
of corporate nannyism. Firms don’t act paternalistically because the managers of
the firm want to do so but rather because employees and owners of the firm
demand that they do. Individuals in common pools—employees in firms,
shareholders in firms, individuals in insurance plans, and citizens in a
jurisdiction—want the managers of those common pools to act paternalistically
toward other individuals, because this lowers the costs of being in the pool. Firms
are simply responding to this demand.
Contrary to the rights-based accounts, paternalism by firms is generally
not premised on malice, invidious discrimination, or exploitation of unequal
bargaining power between managers and employees. It is, in fact, inevitable in
cases where third parties bear some costs of others’ behavior. For example, the
current health care model puts most of the costs on third parties, namely firms
and the government, so we should expect each of these types of organizations to
provide paternalism to reduce these costs. So if firms see increased health care
costs or labor costs (through lower productivity) as a result of employee smoking,
they will rationally try to reduce smoking by employees, say by not employing
smokers or charging smokers sufficiently to offset the costs they are imposing on
others within the firm (be they shareholders or other employees).
Seeing paternalism as a natural consequence of our current welfare system
(either corporate or statist) allows us to recast the debate about paternalism. In
effect, firms and the government are both providers of nanny rules in what we
might call the “market for paternalism.” Both providers in this market offer
nanny rules in response to demand for them from individuals in common pools,
be they political jurisdictions, firms, or insurance pools. These individuals, who
pay more (or accept less) than they otherwise would, demand rules to force fellow
employees or citizens to bear their own costs to avoid compelled cross-subsidies
of costly behavior. The government can satisfy this demand with statutes
proscribing certain behaviors, providing information to attempt voluntary
changes in behavior, or imposing taxes to force cost bearing. Firms can do all of
these things too, although they may have slightly different names. Accordingly,
we can think of the government and firms competing in a sense to deliver
paternalism, which is demanded by individuals. Politicians compete to offer these
Ann Rives, You're Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle Discrimination Legislation, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 553 (2006); Christopher Valleau, If You're Smoking You're Fired: How Tobacco Could Be
Dangerous to More Than Your Health, 10 DePaul J. Health Care L. 457 (2007); Marvin Hill & Emily
Delacenseri, Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices: Lifestyle Regulations and Officious Intermeddlers Bosses, Workers, Courts and Labor Arbitrators, 57 MO. L. REV. 51 (1992); MARVIN HILL AND JAMES
WRIGHT: EMPLOYEE LIFESTYLE AND OFF-DUTY CONDUCT REGULATION (1993).
5
See http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/08/business/ 08smoking.html?_r=2&oref=slogin (quoting
Lewis Maltby, president of the National Workrights Institute: “Once you cross the line and allow
employers to control any type of behavior that's not related to job performance, there's no limit to the harm
that can and will be done.”).
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rules to be reelected, to get campaign contributions, and to maximize their utility,
whatever it is. Managers do the same, but, given the constraints of the markets in
which they operate, are generally directed to acting in ways that align their
interests (making money) with those of shareholders.
This positive account of nannyism is a necessary (but currently missing)
foundation for the normative analysis other scholars engage in on this subject.
We cannot answer the normative question of whether firms should be engaging
in nannyism without knowing why they are doing it. The positive account
consists of five parts, which track the outline of this paper.
First, the economic case for nannyism, which will tell us the reason firms
are increasingly engaging in this type of employee regulation. The answer is the
elimination of cross-subsidies and the forced internalization of externalities
imposed on fellow members of common pools.
Second, the history of corporate nannyism, which will tell us how these
rules are deployed in practice, and whether they are used for good or bad reasons,
and whether they are checked by market forces. The key takeaway from this brief
history is that corporate nannies act predominately in cases in which employee
conduct increases firm costs, and that labor markets provide a strong check on
firm overreaching. This was true even when labor markets were much less liquid
than today and worked best when nanny rules were linked directly with reducing
bottom-line costs.
Third, the advantages of corporate nannyism compared with state
nannyism, which will tell us whether we should, in the marginal case, prefer
nanny rules from state or corporate actors. There are reasons to believe corporate
nannies are superior to their state analogs in some cases. For instance, corporate
policies are subjected to more instantaneous feedback from labor markets, which
reduces overreaching but also helps solve information problems in ways likely to
reduce the sum of decision and error costs. This section also shows that there is
no theory under which the state or firm will always be superior at imposing
nanny limitations on behavior.
Fourth, the regulatory environment for using nanny rules. The
government is not only a provider of nanny rules, but it also regulates firms in
providing these rules. This regulation has the potential to distort efficient
outcomes unless it is premised on legitimate advantages of states in providing
paternalism. This section shows how many existing court cases, statutes, and
rules stand in the way of an efficient market for paternalism.
And, finally, the normative questions about whether corporate nannyism
is socially beneficial and suggestions for policy responses. On the normative
issues, thinkers from John Stuart Mill to Milton Friedman assert that the state
has no business interfering in private decisions, like whether to eat trans fats,
bungee jump, or smoke. Friedman famously wrote: “I don't think the state has
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any more right to tell me what to put in my mouth than it has to tell me what can
come out of my mouth.”6 This paper puts these issues largely to one side, since
the premise of these objections assumes that others aren’t bearing costs from
what is going in Friedman’s mouth. In a world with social paying, there is
inevitably paternalism. In light of this, the relevant question is only whether we
should favor one nanny over another, which is just another way of asking how the
market for paternalism should be regulated.
In terms of policy, the argument that there exists a market for paternalism
and that firms have potential advantages in its efficient delivery bears not only on
the wisdom of the existing regulations that may distort the market, but also on
the current debate about eliminating employer financed health care. Although
moving away from this model to either an individual model or a national model
has virtues and vices, one benefit not yet considered is the potential that a more
liberalized role for firms in the market for paternalism would have on reducing
costly behaviors like smoking or overeating.
THE THEORY OF NANNYISM

I.

Nannies exist because some individuals are viewed as incapable of making
good decisions or fending for themselves. The classic example is an adult, like
Mary Poppins, acting in loco parentis. Presumably there have been nannies in
this role for all of human times. “Nannyism,” however, describes a seemingly
more modern phenomenon in which political entities—pejoratively, the “nanny
state”—prohibit certain types of behavior, such as riding a motorcycle without a
helmet, eating trans fats, or talking on a cell phone while driving. The nanny state
“began in earnest with seat-belt regulations and compulsory helmet wearing in
the 1980s.”7 States are not alone in acting this way, which is what this paper is
about.
The nanny’s belief that individuals are disabled, and thus the motivation of
the nanny, could be benign or self-serving. Some nannies will be motivated by a
genuine desire to help the individual or to force an individual to internalize the
costs of their behavior, while some will be motivated by a desire to impose their
own idiosyncratic preferences on others. In reality, most cases will involve some
mix of these two motives, as the ability to distinguish between these two
categories may be imperfect for even the most self-less nannies. Let us consider
each of them.

6

Interview Rob Kampia of the Marijuana Policy Project, Nov. 2006, available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMJ3eX4BwTA..
7
DAVID HARSANYI, THE NANNY STATE at 13.
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A. “Good” Nannies
There are several reasons why an individual might not objectively be able
to make good decisions: incapacity (as in the case of infants or the mentally
infirm), lack of information, insufficient processing skills, or a disconnect
between reaping the benefits of an action and paying its costs.8 Most of these are
unobjectionable and not really “nannyism,” as it is defined in this paper. But
since they are related and an understanding of their scope is relevant for defining
what nannyism is, let us consider them in turn.
Few, if any, object to nannyism for minors or the provision of information
by third parties, although the latter may be subject to cost-benefit criticisms.
Deciding for individuals because they are deemed incapable of using the
necessary information to make good decisions is theoretically unobjectionable,
but likely a much harder case in practice.
Processing problems are a trickier case. It is well documented that
individuals may suffer from various behavioral heuristics preventing them from
accurately forecasting expected costs and benefits in ways that skew decisions
from the optimal ones. A first move here is for a third party to use default rules—
what Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler call “nudges”—to encourage better overall
decision making.9 Unlike providing information, which is generally not
considered nanny-like behavior, nudging is paternalism, although its advocates
claim it is soft-core paternalism because it preserves choice. Whatever we call it,
the idea of manipulating decisions that are perceived by outsiders to be
erroneous may be good or bad from a social welfare perspective. The answer
likely varies by topic, insider, outsider, and circumstance, such that the concept
of nudging is unobjectionable, but the application in particular cases may be
socially costly.10 (In this paper, we will compare the use of nudging by firms and
the government with the hope of determining which type of third party is likely to
have more good nudges than bad.)
The easiest case in which paternalism is justified is when individuals are
imposing costs on others, and since this is the primary justification for most
modern nannyism, it is worth spending some time fleshing it out.
1. Internalization of externalities
Economists call costs imposed on others “externalities,” and argue if
individuals do not bear the full costs of their conduct, we will get socially
inefficient levels of production of it. Smoking is a classic example: if individuals
8

“Costs” includes all social, real dollar, and other costs arising from a particular form of conduct.
See CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE (2008).
10
See Robert Frank, Should Public Policy Respond to Positional Externalities?, 92 J. PUBLIC ECON. 1777
(2008).
9
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are not forced to pay the costs of their conduct (say, compensating victims of
second-hand smoke or taxpayers who subsidize their health care costs),
individuals will smoke too much. This class of cases likely represents the largest
source of nanny motivation, although the lines here will be blurry. Nannies may
make errors in determining the existence of or size of the externalities, or may
use externality arguments as an excuse to aggrandize power, to oppress political
outsiders, or to try to impose their own views on others. Perhaps most ominously,
externality arguments inevitably sweep in far too much and may lead to obviously
troubling intervention by third parties. Constraints on reducing errors or
overreaching are therefore essential to efficient nannyism.
In the abstract, however, the idea of forcing internalization of costs is
unobjectionable. Even libertarians should not be troubled in theory by attempts
to get individuals to pay the full social costs of their conduct. These efforts meet
John Stuart Mill’s test of liberty—a state may not prevent individuals from acting,
except where doing so would bring harm to others. In this way and in these cases,
nannies serve an important social welfare function by substituting the judgment
of cost bearers for cost imposers.
Externalities, which undergird good “nannyism” for competent adults,
arise in two ways. First, individuals may not internalize costs over all of their
future selves. That is, the current self may not consider fully costs imposed on the
future self, and therefore engage in activities that are welfare reducing for the
entire collection of selves. Second, individuals may not internalize costs imposed
on others.11
The regulation of smoking evidences both of these forms. Legislation
aimed at reducing smoking, including taxes, bans, and limits on advertising, is
premised on both protecting individuals from themselves (that is, protecting
future selves) and protecting others from the deleterious effects of smoking.
“Others” here includes anyone who will bear a cost from someone else’s smoking,
including waiters, other patrons, family members, and taxpayers or individuals in
common insurance pools with the smokers, who bear increased health
expenditure costs. Not bearing these full costs of smoking means individuals will
smoke at inefficient levels.12
11

Both of these involve difficult calculations and empirical evidence. In addition, the intra-individual
calculation portends potentially invidious determinations of individuals’ “true” preferences. In other words,
the sum of decision costs and error costs are likely to be high in both cases, but are likely to be higher in the
intra-individual case.
12
The existence of risk-pooled health insurance does not in of itself lead to an externality problem.
“The externality arises only if health insurance premiums do not reflect enrollee weight, such as if
heterogeneous (obese and non-obese) enrollees are lumped into a single risk pool. In the case when
premiums are actuarially fair, even if individuals are fully insured, they will still have an incentive to
decrease expected medical care expenditures through weight loss as weight loss lowers health insurance
premiums.” Jay Bhattacharya & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance and the Obesity Externality, Working Paper
11529, http://www.nber.org/papers/w11529.
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There is a definitional question here, however, as this externality problem
is what underlies everything from environmental laws to the tort system and
criminal law.13 In this sense, all regulation is a form of nannyism. But this isn’t
what the term usually means. “Nannyism” is defined narrowly to relate primarily
to the choices made by individuals that are historically regarded as personal, such
as what to eat, what to drink, whether to smoke, what to do in one’s spare time,
and so on. Nannies take care of children and police their choices about what to
play with, what to wear, what to eat, when to sleep, and other personal matters. It
is this parallel policing of adults that gives rise to the term nannyism. For
purposes of this paper, the analysis is restricted to predominately those activities
that may increase health care costs. The analysis may be extendable to other
costs, but this may be tricky, as more and more law and social behavior is
implicated, and internalization arguments can easily become difficult to untangle
from excuses for invidious discrimination.14 These contours are examined below.
2. Paying, and what that means
There are generally two choices for the payment of the social costs of
activities. Most obviously, we could hold individuals or individual entities
responsible for the costs they impose on others or society. This approach has
been widely advocated in various literatures as the most effective way of creating
the optimal social incentives. If individuals bear the full costs of their actions
(that is, internalize all the costs they impose on others), then we would expect the
individuals to police their own conduct in ways that strike the efficient balance
between utility gain and loss (or benefit and cost). Taxes are a common
mechanism for doing this. But there may be many cases in which individuals
cannot pay, are not sufficiently sensitive to costs, are viewed as victims or unable
to pay, or are not the least cost avoiders. Taxes may be regressive, individuals
may be judgment proof, or other entities may be able to provide particular
monitoring functions at lower cost across multiple individuals because of
economies of scale and scope. Individuals may also suffer from systematic
decision making biases, which would blunt the perceived benefits of cost
internalization.
If individuals who generate costs are unable to pay or would be unable to
make welfare-maximizing decisions in any event, law looks to the other option for
paying costs, third parties. The most common example in the law is the payment,
either voluntarily or legally required, by an entity, like a corporation or the
13

Pollution is the archetypical example. By forcing firms to pay for the social costs of pollution, say
through an emissions tax, society can ensure that firms do not produce at inefficient levels.
14
There are numerous activities, behaviors, or characteristics that are protected by common and statutory
law, and that are not within the scope of nannyism as defined in this paper. For example, rights of
association, religion, race, sexuality, speech, etc.
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government. An example of the former is the doctrine of respondeat superior; an
example of the latter is the social safety net found in programs ranging from
Social Security to Medicaid.
It is in this cost bearing by third parties that nannyism starts. Third parties
who are liable for the costs imposed by others will inevitably engage in actions
designed to reduce those costs. In fact, it would irrational for the third parties to
not try to influence the behavior of the individuals imposing the costs, since it
would be subsidizing socially inefficient conduct. In effect, the third-party payor
is acting as if it were the individual forced to bear all its costs, and would be
expected to act accordingly.
Since conduct considered “private” inevitably produces social or group
costs, nannyism is a certainty. As long as others are paying for the costs imposed
by individuals, the others will want a say in conduct that purports to generate
those costs. This is true whether the third-party payor is the corporation or the
government. As shown below, company towns had similar levels of paternalism,
regardless of whether the owner was a firm or the federal government.15 This is
true today as well. Both firms and the government, which pay most health care
expenditures, are increasingly active in policing health and safety practices in an
attempt to reduce health care costs. To cite just one example, both firms and
governments are using or considering using taxes on individual weight or body
mass index (BMI) to try to reduce the incidence of obesity by forcing individuals
to bear the full costs of their eating.16
Nannyism should also be expected to grow in proportion to the costs born
by third parties. It is therefore no surprise to see an increase in nanny laws and
nanny-like behavior at times in which much of the responsibility for paying the
social costs of conduct have shifted from individuals to the state, firms, and
others. Accordingly, we should expect to see more state nannyism in jurisdictions
where costs are more socialized. A recent survey in the United Kingdom supports
this conclusion. In a country where all health care costs are borne by the state, 75
percent of citizens want more government intervention to discourage people from
unhealthy eating habits.17
The same trend is seen domestically, as federal, state, and local
governments bear increasing health care costs, both directly and indirectly
through lost productivity. The so-called “Twinkie tax,” a one percent tax on soft
drinks, candy, fast food, and other “unhealthy” food is a classic example.
Proposed by Yale food researcher Kelly Brownwell, the tax was seriously
15

See infra note __.
See, e.g., “Obesity boom will cost tax payers,” BBC.com (Oct. 7, 2008), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7656214.stm (showing costs to taxpayers and predicting future fat tax);
“Government unit ‘urges fat tax’,” BBC.com (Feb. 19, 2004), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3502053.stm (noting that the government is considering a fat tax).
17
HARSANYI, NANNY STATE, supra note __ at 10-11.
16
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considered by New York City, Detroit, and numerous other state and local
governments.18 Arguments for the tax range from the costs imposed on
government, the inability of individuals to resist the temptations their future
selves will later regret, and the costs imposed on other third parties, like airlines
who pay higher fuel costs flying heavier people around.19 Another example is
smoking. Both private firms and some governments have effectively banned
smoking, even if done in the privacy of one’s car or apartment. As detailed below,
several firms have explicit policies forbidding the hiring or employment of
smokers, while in 2006 Belmont, California banned smoking anywhere in the
city, even in private residences.20
Costs are therefore the door through which nannyism comes, but attempts
to restrain them may not be objectionable to all but the most strident
libertarians, unless they cross some line. Few would object to the cameras
installed on delivery trucks or government-run hospitals from serving
predominately healthy food. The real line-drawing problem arises when the link
between conduct and costs becomes more attenuated or outside of a certain
sphere of third-party influence. It might be obvious that a city could ban
firefighters from smoking on the job, but what about at home? No one would
criticize an airline that restricted pilots from drinking while flying, but what
about when off duty when there is no chance of spillover to work hours? Smoking
and drinking after hours in both cases may raise costs, both in terms of risk and
health insurance outlays, but there is an intuition that the restrictions on private
behavior are different in some way, more out of bounds.
Of course, third-party payors will have to balance of the costs of imposing
restrictions versus benefits of cost reduction, and this may provide a natural
break on extending nannyism too far down the causal chain. We will see below
that the ability to do this calculation and several other features of corporations
may give them an advantage (over the government) at being benign and efficient
nannies.
B. “Bad” Nannies
There are two ways in which nannyism, whatever its source, may be
socially suboptimal. The first type of bad nanny is one with good intentions that
makes mistakes in calculating the social costs and benefits from particular
behaviors. There are a variety of miscalculations that are possible. Nannies may
reasonably believe externalities exist when they do not (false positive) or that
there are no externalities from a particular behavior when in fact there are (false
18

Id at 37-40. See also Suzanne Leigh, “‘Twinkie Tax’ worth a try in fight against obesity,” USA TODAY,
Dec. 1, 2004.
19
For a discussion, see section __ below.
20
HARSANYI, NANNY STATE, supra note __ at 125.
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negative). Even when externalities are plain, nannies may systematically
misestimate the costs imposed on society by individual behaviors, including
failing to consider the potential for unintended consequences from restricting
individual liberty. Thus nanny rules can be either under or over-inclusive, or,
given heterogeneous preferences among regulated individuals, differential impact
of rules on behavior, and imperfect enforcement, both at the same time. These
potential errors will be especially apparent because nannies have limited
resources for determining the costs and benefits of particular rules. In light of
these potential errors, the optimal nanny will be one that minimizes the sum of
decision costs and error costs. A comparison along this dimension between
corporate and democratic nannies is made below.
The second type of bad nanny is one that uses a position of power to try to
impose selfish and potentially socially costly preferences on others. The only
difference between this group and the first group of bad nannies is the intent of
the nanny; the “mistakes” may be the same, but the motivation will be different
and the mistakes will be deliberate in a sense. For example, a rule-maker, be it a
legislator or corporate chief, may think smoking is selfish and disgusting or
believe smokers are innocent rubes coerced by greedy tobacco companies, and
therefore prefer a world in which no one smoked. The rule-maker’s preferences
may be roughly aligned or 180 degrees divergent from the socially optimal policy,
but in each case the rule maker is likely to couch justifications for the nanny rules
in benign terms linked with alleged externalities and social costs. These
justifications will mask the possibility of the nannies acting as idiosyncratic
busybodies or rent seekers.
Examples of bad nannyism are familiar, including most famously
Prohibition, where do-gooders known as the Temperance Movement succeeded
in banning the sale and consumption of alcohol, but underestimated human
nature and the criminal consequences of driving alcohol underground. The
Temperance Movement believed that alcohol consumption imposed costs on
society,21 which it certainly does, but erred in imposing a regulatory regime that
was disproportionate to the actual costs of the conduct. The government as nanny
believed that it could reduce the costs imposed by drinking without raising other
costs and distorting natural behaviors in unpredictable ways. In other words, the
cost-benefit calculation done by the regulator excluded the dynamic costs that
arose from the regulation itself.
Distinguishing between bad nanny types (or between good and bad
nannies) will be difficult. The more difficult it is to sort ex ante between good and
bad, the greater the opportunity for nannies to rent seek and profit from
imposing nanny rules. The most obvious example of this is the “Bootleggers and
21

JACK S. BLOCKER, DAVID M. FAHEY, AND IAN R. TYRRELL EDS. ALCOHOL
MODERN HISTORY: AN INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 2 VOL. (2003).
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Baptists” theory.22 Both those who sell alcohol illicitly (bootleggers) and those
who oppose drinking on moral grounds (Baptists) have incentives to restrict the
sale of alcohol, either entirely or, less ambitiously, on Sundays. The economic and
moral arguments generate an “unholy alliance” that politicians can exploit by
taking money from the former and using the arguments of the latter to get votes.
The exploitation of moral or social cost arguments for private economic
(or political) gains is not limited to politicians. Businesses can use government
power for this end too. For instance, the first child labor laws in England, which
were proposed to Parliament by a blue-ribbon commission composed of mill
owners who, by virtue of their technological advantage over rival mills, could
afford to and in fact preferred to raise the costs of labor by reducing its supply.23
It is also true today, cutting both for an against nanny rules. Tobacco companies
and the ACLU have teamed up to support legislation restricting the ability of
employers to ban smoking outside of the workplace. Tobacco companies
obviously want to maintain their market, while the ACLU wants to protect
privacy interests in general. This modern application of “Bootleggers and
Bapitists”, call it “Cigarette Vendors and Constitutional Defenders,” is based on
the economic interests of the tobacco companies and the political views of the
ACLU. This alliance of interests similarly provides politicians with the lucrative
go-between possibilities—they can take money from tobacco companies while
claiming to support the restrictions on corporate nannyism with rhetoric about
privacy and the Bill of Rights. In any event, this public choice-like story makes it
difficult to unpack the virtue of the restrictions on individual liberty.
In light of these mixed motives and the difficulty in interpreting them, the
best one can probably say is that we can only tell good from bad, or one type of
bad from another, based on outcomes. Nanny rules that persevere and do not
generate widespread consensus about excessive burdens are generally good,
while others are bad. The problem, of course, is that sorting ex post in this way
will be biased by the sensitivity of nannies to political or market forces. If these
forces are weak, socially inefficient rules may survive, even if they are known to
be such, unless the cost of the inefficiency is enough to overcome this weakness.
In light of this, it is essential to assign the locus of nannyism to those situations
or entities that will be subjected to the most rigorous political or market checks.
When there are monopolies of power, there is by definition less constraint
on action, by either political or market forces. Politicians who face no election
threat or who have constituents with very high costs of moving jurisdictions are
less likely to deliver nanny rules that come close to efficiency; corporations that
are monopsonists in the labor market are similarly subject to less oversight that
22

Bruce Yandle, "Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist." 7
REGULATION 12 (1983).
23
Id.
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would help constrain bad nannyism. Firms are subject to much greater oversight
by labor, product, and capital markets than politicians are by elections, and
therefore should be preferred nannies, all else being equal.
But first let us consider the ways in which corporations are increasingly
engaging in nannyism. The history of corporate nannyism supports the claim that
the deployment of paternalist rules by firms is tied to externalities imposed by
employees and is, even in relatively illiquid labor markets, dramatically
constrained by market forces.
II.

CORPORATE NANNYISM

The history of corporate nannyism is about economics, not domination. By
tracing the rise of modern nannyism by firms back to its origins—in so-called
company towns—the motivations of and constraints on firm nannyism are plain.
A. Origins
The first manifestation of corporate nannyism as we think of it today was
in the development and operation of “company towns” during the early industrial
revolution.24 Company towns, like Pullman, Illinois, and Coulee Dam,
Washington, were communities in which a single business built, owned, and
operated the entire town. These towns appeared throughout the industrializing
West (England, France, America, Sweden, and Germany) during the 1830s, and
were common in some locations and in some industries until the 1940s.25 This
was an era that combined rapid industrialization and the exploitation of natural
resources in remote locations,26 with the development of various social
movements concerned with improving public morality. The combination of
Victorian sensibilities, business growth, and physical isolation provided a perfect
formula for business owners to take a strong nanny approach to workers.
Companies provided everything for employees in company towns—homes,
stores, parks, roads, entertainment, medical clinics, and on and on—all of which
were owned by the business enterprise, often a single entrepreneur, like George
Pullman or Frank Gilchrist. Many company towns paid for public amenities, like
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sewage, garbage collecting, and gas lighting, that only the “most affluent suburbs
of the time could afford.”27
To paraphrase Adam Smith, these amenities were not provided out of
benevolence but self-interest on the part of the firm. Companies needed to build
towns with amenities on site to attract workers to remote locations for difficult
and often dangerous work in mining, timber, or construction.28 Even in relatively
straightforward industries, like mills, historians attribute the provision of
amenities to the fact that “[m]ill owners had to furnish housing to obtain a labor
force.”29
Self-interest (not benevolence or busy-bodiness) also explained the link
between firm ownership of the town and firm intervention in the seemingly
private lives of employees.30 Firm ownership of the physical and human capital in
company towns led inexorably to paternalism to control costs and maintain the
firm’s investment. As one historian describes it, “[g]enerosity . . . brought
intrusiveness.”31 Company town bosses “used their power as the owners of the
village to control their employees,” 32 because it was cost-effective and efficient
for them to do so.33 Paternalism wasn’t about “seek[ing] to reform the laboring
classes or correct social evils,” but was about minimizing the firm’s labor and
other costs—in short, it was a “ploy to attract and retain workers.”34
From the perspective of the firms, nannyism was justified because firms
were paying for nearly all the costs of running the town and feeding and caring
for employees, as well as bearing all of the costs of misbehavior on the part of
employees. Drunkenness led to absenteeism or accidents and mistreatment of
one’s home, which was owned by the firm, caused the firm to spend money to
preserve its investment in it and the other homes surrounding it. Companies did
not expect to recoup investments in towns through direct income, but rather
viewed amenities as “subsidies to the employee” for which it therefore had the
right to “demand certain concessions” from employees.35
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Control was pervasive. Companies regulated drinking, smoking, gambling,
cleanliness, speech, association rights, and also, more generally, morals.
Companies would monitor employees in public and private settings, and would
fire those who, in the view of the firm’s bosses, were “straying from the path of
virtue.”36 Workers were also disciplined for trivialities, like failing to maintain
their homes and yards in good condition. One company town boss, Frank
Gilchrist of Gilchrist, Oregon, “drove around town, upbraiding those whose yards
weren’t clean and tidy.”37 Gilchrist did this not only because of his personal
preferences about tidiness, but because he was highly subsidizing the rent of
employees’ homes—it was partially his yard.38 Firms also regulated private
behaviors inside homes. The owner of one mill “made a practice of walking
around [workers’ houses] at nine o’clock every night to knock on the doors of
those who were still up to tell them to put out the lights and go to bed.”39 These
policies lead historians of company towns to characterize some entrepreneurs as
“playing God” with their workers.40
There were many reasons for playing God, all of which were directed at the
firm’s bottom line. Paternalism helped recruit employees and reduce turnover,
since it was often accompanied by generous welfare programs and it was
frequently associated with safe, cheap, and happy places to live and work.41 For
example, after a tremendous increase in absenteeism and turnover at a
molybdenum mine in Climax, Colorado, the president of the firm, Arthur Bunker,
ordered a nanny program, called “Design for Man,” to be implemented to
“stabilize employment.” The company provided numerous welfare programs and
amenities, and, lo and behold, turnover was reduced.42 Nannyism also helped
businesses “maintain their financial investment in buildings and grounds” as well
as the human capital deployed by the firm.43
The link between ownership and control, or, in economic terms, the cost
bearing function and the cost prevention function, is supported by the fact that
the level of nannyism in company towns was proportional to the amount of the
firm’s ownership stake in the town. Towns that provided lots of free amenities,
like housing and recreational facilities, were ruled by “benevolent despot[s],”
36
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while “[a]t the other extreme were towns that furnished few amenities but
imposed few controls.”44
On the surface and in general, company towns were deemed to be
successful experiments in a new kind of worker-manager relationship, and as
visions for a new way of improving social welfare. Observers in the 1860s, 1890s,
and as late as the 1920s, remarked about the social progress and “upliftment”
created by the “pleasing environments” of company towns.45 The corporate
nanny was born as an alternative to government paternalism for improving
individual social welfare. There were sensible reasons why outsourcing
paternalism to private firms might have been socially optimal at the time of the
company town. Most obviously, many of these towns were remote and
government monitoring of behavior would be much more costly and not
necessarily better than private monitoring and enforcement.46
Corporate nannyism in company towns ended when company towns fell
out of fashion. One theory for their demise blames excessive paternalism.
Overbearing nannyism undoubtedly played a role in the demise of certain towns.
Corporate chiefs, like George Pullman, were known as “meddlesome and
oppressive,”47 and this undoubtedly contributed to conflict between workers and
management in company towns.48 Although some believe “[p]aternalism was
Pullman’s undoing,” in general worker mobility constrained arbitrary and
capricious corporate nannyism, even when the firm had a large ownership stake
in workers and their possessions. Employees had exit options, and these were
effective substitutes for their lack of voice in the affairs of the town.49 “Skilled
labor was relatively unfettered,”50 and this was reinforced by the fact that life in
company towns was one of few owned possessions that would tie workers to
44
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particular locations.51 The ability of workers to opt out of oppressive company
towns was so easy and prevalent that historians refer to claims of capture of
employees by firms in company towns as “an exaggeration”—“[w]orkers
unsatisfied with their situation could pick up and leave.”52
By the 1920s, more workers were choosing to do so, since the booming
economy made other options attractive. Workers recognized the trade off
between firm-provided amenities and wages, and many “would [have] prefer[ed]
a larger paycheck,”53 and so opted for work that would provide cash in lieu of
amenities. Firms were finding out that buying loyalty with amenities, which were
coupled with paternalism, was unsustainable, especially when paternalism was
not proportional to the costs being imposed on the firm. Pullman failed in part
because of market constraints on excessive nannyism.
The history of company towns provides strong foundational support for
the claims made below about the role of corporate nannyism in modern America.
Nannyism arose not out of bias or for ulterior motives, but rather to control costs
being born directly by the firm. The level of paternalism on the part of firms was
directly proportional to the impact that behavior had on the firm’s bottom line,
meaning firms that were not paying things like health care costs did not engage in
nanny-like regulations of health. In addition, labor markets provided a check on
excessive nannyism. Where corporate chiefs meddled too much, workers fled,
preferring cash to amenities plus nanny rules, thereby providing a market check
on inefficient nannyism.
B. Henry Ford’s “Sociological Department”
Not all corporate nannies of this era were operating company towns.54
Henry Ford deployed a vast “Sociological Department” to supervise the private
conduct of Ford employees, none of whom were living in homes paid for directly
by Ford Motor Company or shopping in company stores. The deployment and
eventual disbandment of the Sociological Department, however, comports with
the history of company towns described above.
Ford instituted his nanny program in direct response to adverse labor
conditions. The assembly line manufacturing process he instituted was
51
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wonderfully efficient and productive, but it made the work monotonous, and as a
result during the years 1911 to 1913, Ford Motor suffered extremely high
employee absenteeism and turnover. Ford responded in January 1914 by offering
employees a dramatic increase in pay—the famous $5 day—but reasonably
worried that some workers might spend the windfall in ways that would
undermine his labor efficiency goals. Ford also believed that workers from
healthy, stable and harmonious homes make more productive workers.55
Ford set up a “Sociological Department”56 to ensure the precondition that
workers “not debauch the additional money [they] receive[]” under the $5 day.57
Workers who drank, did not save, or otherwise did not comport with Ford’s views
of the good life, would not qualify for the wage.58 In fact, employees did not
automatically qualify for the $5-a-day pay increase. Instead, they had to undergo
provisional monitoring by the Sociological Department. Two years after the pay
increase was implemented, 90 percent of company employees had qualified.
Qualification could be revoked at any time, however, if officials believed the
employee was engaging in undesirable behavior. If the department found that an
employee was not living up to standards, he would be put on a 6-month
probation period and his pay would be cut. If, at the end of that time period,
significant improvement had not taken place, he would be fired.59
The Department deployed a team of 150 to investigate the lifestyle of each
Ford employee and ensure that they were not participating in activities that
would make them ineligible for the wage increase, such as smoking, drinking,
gambling, and prostitution.60 Inspectors also examined employees spending and
saving habits.61 If inspectors detected problems, they were able to offer
employees advice on issues including childcare, money management, alcohol
abuse, personal hygiene, and house maintenance.62 Ford used the Sociological
Department to “shape the character, domestic life, and financial habits of Ford
workers.”63 His goals, although couched in moralistic terms, were purely
economic—the purpose was to reduce the uncertainty of labor costs that arose
because of the introduction of assembly-line manufacturing.
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Ford’s Sociological Department was well received by many of the
progressive-era industrial leaders and politicians of the time, who believed that it
would help resolve the tensions between workers and industrialists and reform
workers into more responsible citizens.64 Reformers including Ida Tarbell and
John R. Commons were particularly praising of Ford’s efforts.65 In 1915, however,
the Congressional Commission on Industrial Relations became concerned with
Ford’s efforts to assume “so large a measure of responsibility, not only for the
labor conditions in its plants, but also for the social and moral surroundings of its
employees.”66 In his testimony, Ford justified his programs as an earnest effort to
improve the lives of his workers.67 Ford’s program received additional criticism
from many newspapers, the majority of which were concerned that his programs
were overly paternalistic, raising workers wages, but treating them like children
in exchange.68
The Sociological Department came to an end when Ford opened the River
Rouge plant in 1920. Ford manager Charles E. Sorensen claimed that the
department would interfere with production, and Henry Ford claimed to have
had tired of the experiment.69 By the time Ford wrote his memoirs in 1922, his
views on paternalism and the work of his Sociological Department had
completely changed. He wrote:
[P]aternalism has no place in industry. Welfare work that consists
in prying into employees' private concerns is out of date. Men need
counsel and men need help, oftentimes-special help; and all this
ought to be rendered for decency's sake. But the broad workable
plan of investment and participation will do more to solidify
industry and strengthen organization than will any social work on
the outside. Without changing the principle we have changed the
method of payment.70
Ford’s reflection is revealing—he notes that Ford Motor Company
continued to invest in worker retention, but shifted from nannyism to inclusion
(called participation) in the firm’s decision making process. The move to
corporate democracy from corporate paternalism reflected broader trends in
society, not the least of which was the rise of powerful labor unions, which
aggressively pushed for worker protection from termination (thus undermining
the essential threat that made corporate nannyism possible) and more control
64
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over the firm. Ford’s competitors also started to be able to offer competitive
wages, and thus the thickening of the labor market also dramatically reduced
Ford’s control over workers. Just as in the case of company towns, the ability to
sell one’s labor down the street at another similar firm provided a natural break
on the reach of the corporate nanny.
After Ford’s grand experiment, corporate nannyism abated. There were
undoubtedly cases of firms trying to force employees to internalize the costs they
imposed on others, but the power of unions and the highly liquid labor markets
in this country constrained this behavior to isolated cases. In addition, the biggest
driver of modern corporate nannyism—health care costs—was much less of a
concern. Prevailing social norms at the time, like widespread accepting of
smoking, and external factors, like dramatically lower health-care costs on
average, were sufficient to make any corporate concern over employee behavior
much less important for firms. Moreover, it wasn’t until the 1980s revolution in
the way executives were compensated that “shareholder value” became the
rallying cry of managers and the be-all-end-all of firm management. In a world in
which maximizing the value of shares is paramount, firms will inevitably care
more about employee behavior and things like health care costs, since these costs
go right to the bottom line of firm profitability. It is to this modern era of
corporate nannyism that we now turn.
C. The Modern Corporate Nanny
Corporate nannies today are concerned mostly about employee health care
costs and issues.71 Health care costs include direct costs, such as insurance costs,
as well as indirect costs, such as lost productivity, absenteeism caused by
illnesses, and other secondary costs. The reasons are plain. These costs go
directly to firms’ bottom lines, are large and growing, are susceptible to nanny
rules, and other potential externality-causing firm activities have fallen by the
wayside. Unlike the era of company towns, most firms do not own employee
housing, the shops where employees buy everything, or provide services like
parks, hospitals, and recreational facilities. Corporate nanny activities today are
concerned only with activities associated clearly with firm costs.
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About 60 percent of Americans receive their health insurance through
their employers,72 and in 2006, firms spent nearly $500 billion on employee
health insurance.73 Since employers are paying and paying a lot, they obviously
have a strong interest in improving employee health. This interest is growing
because health care expenditures are rising rapidly: from 1960 to 2005, health
care costs rose as a percent of all wages and salaries from about 1 percent to
almost 10 percent.74 According to the nonprofit research firm the Kaiser Family
Foundation, health insurance premiums have risen about 60 percent per year
since 2000. In addition, US firms are believed to be at a disadvantage on the
global market, since companies in other nations pay much less in health care
costs. (The US average is about 13 percent of total payroll spent on health
benefits, compared with about 4 percent for Japan, German, and the United
Kingdom.)75
Two of the biggest causes of these costs are smoking and obesity,76 and
firms are beginning to compete with the government in trying to control them.
Obesity, for example, was estimated to have increased health care costs and lost
productivity by over $70 billion annually in 1994,77 and the percentage of adults
classified as obese has increased from about 12 percent then to over 21 percent in
2001.78 The percentages are undoubtedly much higher today. More recent
estimates ballpark the cost of obese individuals at over $700 per individual per
year compared with individuals of normal weight.79 Studies also find that less
than 15 percent of these extra costs are financed through patient out-of-pocket
payments.80 This means overweight people impose significant direct and indirect
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externalities on skinnier people in common insurance pools or with common
employers.
Smoking causes similar externalities. A 2002 study by the Centers for
Disease Control found that annual productivity losses and health care costs were
$3,391 a smoker. To put this number into the corporate context, if Walmart
employees smoke at the average rate for US adults, Walmart would face and
additional $1.4 billion in expected health care costs compared with a zero
tolerance problem for smoking.81 In the aggregate economy, this figure would be
over $100 billion.82
To combat these and other externality causing behaviors firms are using a
variety of voluntary (carrots) and involuntary (sticks) incentives.83 As discussed
below, legal uncertainty and regulatory distortion has limited experimentation
somewhat to date, but more and more firms are deploying nanny rules designed
to force employees to internalize the costs they are imposing on others.
1. Carrots
Numerous companies have adopted voluntary programs designed to
improve employee health and offset the over $4000 per year in increased health
care costs from obesity and smoking. For example, IBM has a variety of “rebate”
programs that pay employees to act in ways likely to drive down health insurance
costs. Specifically, IBM pays employees who agree to eat healthy, exercise, and
not smoke $150 per year, $300 if they get their entire family to do the same. The
system is voluntary and involves self reporting progress through an online
application.84 Similar programs exist at Aetna ($345 per year for completing
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online courses in health and weight management)85, Dell (rebate of about 10
percent for employees filing out annual health survey and participating in health
improvement program)86, Pacificare Health Systems ($390 per year for
participating in online health training program),87 and many other firms.
Carrots may seem more appealing than sticks, but the two are largely
indistinguishable. For one, there is no practical economic difference between
“rebates” and “fines” without first defining a baseline level of cost. Imagine there
are two individual employees, each of whom is charged $100 for health insurance
by the firm. The first individual volunteers for the health improvement program,
earning a $10 “rebate” on insurance costs, while the second employee does not.
The first employee is paying $90, while the second is paying $100. The situation
is no different than setting the insurance costs at $90 and fining the second
individual $10 for not joining the program.
Another related reason is that in a world of rebates or fines, individual
disclosures will unravel so that what seems voluntary may not indeed be
voluntary. To see this, imagine again a firm with two employees, one of whom is a
smoker and one of whom is not. The firm puts the individuals in a common pool
of insurance, such that the blended insurance rate paid by each is the same and
assumes that one of them is a smoker, but not identifying which one. If the firm
provides voluntary opportunities for the non-smoker to signal this good attribute,
the implication is that the other employee is a smoker, even if that employee
doesn’t say anything about whether she is or isn’t. This may be optimal for the
firm, but it highlights that voluntary programs can have the effect of quickly
sorting employees (that is the point), and as a result revealing as much about
volunteers as non-volunteers. As such, any losses suffered by the non-volunteers,
such as privacy losses, will be the same in an environment of carrots as sticks.
There are some differences between carrots and sticks, which are evident
when we examine the sticks as used by firms today.
2. Sticks
Involuntary programs, or sticks, are more varied than voluntary ones.
Corporations currently deploy “no hiring” policies, mandatory health
assessments, and penalties, including financial penalties and termination, for
certain behaviors. Because, as discussed below, legal risk and uncertainty is
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undoubtedly higher for firms deploying these programs than voluntary ones, they
are more rare and are often led by individual managers that feel passionately
about them. Typical is Jim Hagedorn, the CEO of Scotts Miracle-Gro Company,
who admits that this “is an area where CEOs are afraid to go.”88 He argues,
however, that as healthcare costs have exploded (Scotts’s annual healthcare bill
soared 43% in 4 years, amounting to 20% of the company’s net profits), and “the
government and health insurance industry weren’t doing anything to solve the
crisis,” companies “paying the bills” were the ones who needed to take action.89
According to him and others, this action also needed to be increasingly sticks. In
the experience of Scotts, wellness programs offering incentives like gym
discounts or healthy eating bonuses weren’t sufficient to motivate employees the
way that docking pay will. As the Benefits Chief of Scotts said, “We tried carrots;
carrots didn’t work.”
The different types of mandatory programs currently deployed by firms
can be seen by comparing the range of firm policies aimed at deterring smoking.
The simplest program is to implement a “no smokers” hiring policy like Alaska
Airlines has had since the mid-1980s and Union Pacific has had since 2004.90
Firms like Weyco, mentioned above, take this a step further by not only hiring
only non-smokers, but also firing current employees who fail nicotine tests. (As
part of its no-hiring policy, Alaska Airlines told applicants they would be tested
for nicotine use, but there is no public evidence that they ever did so.)91 A slightly
less aggressive approach is to charge higher insurance premiums for smokers.
Several employers, such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Northwest Airlines, Pepsi Co, and
Meijer, do this. One prominent example is Navistar International Corporation,
which charges smokers $50 per month to help defray increased health insurance
premiums.92 Weyco’s program was recently expanded to include the spouses of
employees; if a husband or wife fails a monthly nicotine test, the employee pays
an additional $80 per month penalty until the spouse quits smoking.
Importantly, if $3000 per year per (or more) employee cost of smoking
noted above is a reasonable estimate, the $50 per month penalty ($600 per year)
used by Navistar does not reflect the full costs imposed by the smoking employee.
The difference may be because of a different, local estimate of the costs of
smoking and/or an estimate that the incentive provided by the penalty is
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sufficient to deter all smokers (say, because social norms will fill the gap once a
program is implemented).
This may also suggest that the optimal level of smoking or obesity at the
firm level is not zero, or, to say it another way, that individuals in the common
pool do not demand complete cessation of the offending and costly behavior. This
might be because employees that impose costs might also have unique benefits
that offset these costs, on average at the level set by the firm. Smokers might be
particularly productive workers, for example, and the firm may be simply
summing the benefits and costs to find the optimal level of deterrence. Another
possibility is that the individuals demanding nanny rules are unwilling to bear
the costs on them from a more draconian program. Significant and valuable
liberty interests, for one, might be at stake in more aggressive programs, and
individuals who are forced to bear the costs of the behavior may weigh these in
any deterrence calculation. Or, to put it another way, the firm might reasonably
believe that forcing smokers to internalize all of their costs would send negative
signals to the labor market that might raise the firm’s labor costs, even among
non-smokers. For example, non-smokers might not want to work for a firm that
charged employers because the policy signals something about the firm that is
expected to raise the costs for the individual employee from working there. This
signal could be simply that the firm is likely to have a low tolerance for any crosssubsidies, say on productivity or other considerations beyond smoking that the
employee might be concerned about. Someone who is a shirker or a skydiver
might reasonably believe a non-smoking policy reveals that this is a place where
they shouldn’t work.
Another possibility is that employers do not bear the full insurance-based
costs of employee health, and are therefore not properly incentivized to reduce
behaviors to their optimal level. For example, the federal government pays most
health care for individuals over the age of 65 through a mandatory program
under Medicare. This means that illnesses that manifest after that age are not
part of the employer calculation, since the employer does not have to pay for
them. A final possibility is that firms are risk averse, especially in light of the legal
uncertainty of the rules limiting corporate nannyism discussed below, and thus
are slowly deploying nanny rules to build acceptance in the labor market before
moving to full cost internalization.
Some firms have gone far beyond hiring policies or insurance penalties for
employee behaviors, like smoking or being obese. For example, Clarian Health
developed a mandatory wellness program that, starting in 2009, will charge
employees based on the obesity. Employees with BMI’s over 30 will be charged
$10 per paycheck, along with $5 each for tobacco use, cholesterol over 130, blood
pressure above 140/90, and glucose levels over 120. Western & Southern
Financial Group charges employees whose BMI is too high a tiered fee between
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$15-75 a month; the charge can be adjusted if the BMI improves. So far more
companies have focused on tobacco use, but BMI is another simple (though
potentially inaccurate and certainly incomplete) way to measure an employee’s
health risks associated with obesity.
Firms have also implemented more comprehensive programs covering a
wider range of behaviors, including those of employees’ families. Scotts has taken
the most innovative and comprehensive approach so far. Employees are required
to take an exhaustive and highly personal health risk assessment, asking
questions like: “Do you smoke? Drink? What did your parents die of? Do you
feel down, sad, hopeless? Burned out? How is your relationship with your
spouse? Your kids?” If employees balk, they are forced to pay additional
monthly health insurance premiums (about $40 per month) on the theory that
silence is a signal of poor quality or that penalties are necessary to force
disclosure.
The surveys are not just for sorting. Once employees fill out the
assessment, the firm analyzes the physical, mental, and family health histories of
each employee, cross-references that information with insurance claims data, and
then sets up each “at risk” employee with a health coach and action plan. To
ensure that personal information is not used for illicit purposes, firms routinely
use third party vendors to handle the programs. Those who don’t comply with the
action plan pay an additional health care penalty (about $67 per month). This
plan was designed to charge employees for not doing something to make
themselves healthier, regardless of whether they actually have more insurance
claims or cost the company more money. This design was used because at the
time employers were forbidden from passing along increased health care costs to
individual employees based on their particular characteristics. Federal law,
known as HIPAA, was recently changed to allow companies to pass along a
portion of the extra cost for insuring them. As discussed below, this is likely to
increase the use of penalty programs that directly link payments to individualized
costs.
Health assessments, like those run by Scotts, are eerily reminiscent of
Ford’s “Sociological Department,” and even CEOs concede the programs have
“Big Brother” overtones. Participation rates are very high, however, and having
programs run by a third-party, which most do, alleviates some privacy concerns
and reduces the potential for abuse. In addition, the programs have been
extremely successful. Though in its early stages, the Scotts program has already
been successful in making employees healthier (and in purely business terms,
cheaper). Deadly latent health problems have been revealed and corrected,
several employees have lost a significant amount of weight, 30% of tobacco using
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employees have quit (as of February 2007), and a “get healthy” peer pressure fills
the office.93
More generally, a review of over 70 published studies on corporate
wellness programs finds that every dollar invested in them yields about $3.50 in
benefits from reduced health care costs and improved productivity through
reduced absenteeism.94 The research data suggest that certain characteristics are
clearly associated with increased costs (e.g., excessive body weight and high levels
of stress), while others are more speculative (e.g., cholesterol, alcohol abuse, and
hypertension). The uncertainty about what works and what doesn’t seem to work
points out the need for experimentation and deployment in an environment in
which data will be available and in which those responsible for implementing the
programs will have the incentives to collect and process it in an efficient manner.
These issues will be discussed below.
These benefits are not enough, however, to conclude that corporate
nannyism is a good thing. It might be, for instance, that governments could
accomplish similar or better improvements at lower cost. Governments and firms
are, in fact, competitors in providing nanny rules to force internalization of costs,
and this means that we need an analysis of the potential comparative advantages
of firms before we can conclude that corporate nannyism is a good thing.
III.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CORPORATE NANNYISM

Although nannyism is ubiquitous in a world of third-party payors it is
subjected to wide-spread criticism. There are dozens of books, articles, and thinktank white papers devoted to exposing excessive nannyism and arguing for its
elimination from our society.95 The criticisms focus almost entirely on statesponsored paternalism. Critics ignore two things: first, nannyism by third party
cost bearers is inevitable and social welfare maximizing, insofar as individuals are
forced to bear the costs of their activities; and second, non-state entities, like
business corporations, are increasingly engaging in nannyism. With these things
in mind, the only relevant question is who is the most efficient nanny.
One response might be that firms should simply act as nannies when it is
efficient for them to do so and not when it is not. This approach ignores, however,
that the government is a competitor in the “market for paternalism,” and may put
in place laws or rules that may bias the market in favor of government provision
of paternalism and against firm provision of the same. This dynamic is discussed
below. This section offers several reasons why the nanny corporation may be
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superior to the nanny state at writing efficient rules, and thus undermines any
policies biasing the delivery of paternalism away from corporate actors.
A. Constraining Overreaching
Just as nannyism is inevitable, so too is the risk of overreaching.96 If the
nanny does not accurately measure the size or source of externalities, either out
of self-interest or mistake, the rules it sets will be socially inefficient. The first
advantage that corporations have over the state in making rules designed to
internalize socially costly actions by individuals is the constraint on overreaching
provided by competitive markets for capital, labor, and products. Nanny rules are
inevitably implemented by imperfect agents (either of the citizenry or
shareholders), and markets provide more discipline over inevitable agency costs
than political elections.97 Although this argument is relatively straightforward, it
is worth unpacking it a bit to see the full advantage of firms along this dimension.
1. Opt out
At the most basic level, competition for labor should constrain firms from
imposing restrictions on employee conduct that are excessive or out of relation to
the costs that conduct imposes on the firm’s owners. Corporations face relentless
and finely tuned labor markets in which they are constantly making tradeoffs
between benefits and wages on the one hand and demands and requirements on
the other hand. Firms that miscalculate—say by imposing too much cost on
workers or by forcing them to internalize costs where there are none—will find
their labor costs increase, and as a result, their competitive position
compromised.
The brief history of company towns in America shows the power of labor
markets to constrain overreaching by corporate nannies, even in cases where
labor markets functioned only modestly well. Company towns were isolated
geographically, attracted specialized labor, and were therefore often monopsony
buyers of labor over large geographic and skill areas. And yet, the ability of
individual employees to leave oppressive company towns was a significant factor
in limiting corporate nannyism, and led to the downfall of several company
towns. Today, where labor markets are much more liquid and there are not any
96
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employers with monopoly power in labor markets, the discipline is even more
powerful. The fact that nanny rules are now used exclusively to reduce fairly
obvious firm costs—like health care—supports this claim.
A key feature that provides a break on overreaching is the ability for
employees to opt out by leaving the control of the nanny. This will be much easier
with corporate nannies than state ones. Employees can go to another firm much
more easily than they can go to another jurisdiction; the switching costs are
simply much lower. Very few individuals have firm-specific human capital
commitments, while nearly everyone has jurisdiction-specific commitments.
Houses, friends, family, and so on are often tied to locations, as well as the very
powerful sense of place that many people feel. With job turnover at an all-time
high and the age of the Company Man long gone, these costs are much lower for
employees than citizens.98
The ability to opt out of a political jurisdiction will depend, of course, on
the locus of the nanny rule in question. The more localized the rule, the lower the
switching costs for individuals, all else being equal, since it is much easier to
move streets than cities than states than countries. The smaller the political
entity deploying the nanny rule, the more it looks like a firm and therefore has
some of the advantages of corporate nannyism. Of course, investments in
communities are almost always going to be much higher than investments in
firms; houses, are typically larger and stickier investments than investments in
firm-specific human capital. (As such, we might expect jurisdictions with lots of
renters to be more accountable to their principals and thus write more efficient
nanny rules, all else being equal.)
Firm nanny rules also offer more opt out options than state ones. In the
case of firm health-related penalties, individuals can also opt to pay for their own
insurance. In firms with pay-as-you-smoke policies, individuals can choose to pay
the smoking penalties. Or, if the firm charges higher insurance premiums for
smokers, the individual can buy individual insurance outside of the employment
relationship. This is not an option not only in the case of state bans, but also in
state-sponsored insurance schemes. Individuals simply cannot opt out of
government mandated health plans (such as Medicare, which is effectively
mandatory for individuals over 65), and especially if there is a federally mandated
single-payer health care system.
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Governments also have monopoly on the application of legal force through
the police power, and therefore can make opt out impossible in some cases.
Governments can and have historically criminalized some nanny rules, meaning
the price of the opt out option can be the loss of liberty.99 This may be efficient in
some sense, if the greater penalties are calibrated with less enforcement. Even
then, however, there may still be proportionality and just dessert arguments
about the penalties, and the risks of error in determining the externalities will be
much greater.
2. Accountability
Corporate nannies are also subjected to significantly greater oversight
than government ones. This can be seen by comparing the accountability of
politicians, who design, deploy, and implement state nanny rules, and firm
managers, who do the same for corporate nanny rules. The mechanisms and
frequency of accountability are different and stronger in the case of managers.
Politicians are generally disciplined only through periodic political elections,
while in firms there are two ways in which managers are held to task for their
decisions.
First, like politicians, corporate bosses face episodic “elections,” since they
are usually terminable at will by the board of directors, which in turn is elected
every year (or more often) by the shareholders. But corporate “elections,” be they
formal or informal, take place more frequently, are likely to be influenced by
nanny policies, and are more effective at replacing disloyal or incompetent
agents.
Most obviously, the average tenure for CEOs of the largest thousand public
companies (about 4 years) is less than half that of the average member of
Congress (about 10 years).100 The weakness of political discipline is also
evidenced by the fact that most incumbent politicians win reelection. For the past
four decades, over 95 percent of congressional incumbents have been reelected,
and according to political scientists, less than 20 percent of congressional races
99
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are competitive, meaning the winner won less than 60 percent of the vote.101
Similar results obtain in political races at nearly all levels of government. It is
possible that these results are evidence that politicians calibrate the amount of
paternalism nearly perfectly, but this is unlikely. For one, the existence of a
vibrant anti-paternalist movement suggests significant overreaching that is not
manifest at the ballot box.
In addition, nanny issues may not be sufficient to move elections, and, in
any event, politicians need satisfy only 50 percent plus one of the electorate to be
reelected. This means that not only will elections not check abuse against
minority views (say, in favor of smoking or being obese), but also that the
minorities will not be able to opt out of any majoritarian rule. If anything,
discipline may arise in a sort-of punctuated equilibrium model in which voter
frustration with nannyism may get so severe as to impact an election. Another
way of saying this is that employees voting with their feet will determine what
“excessive” is, and that the costs for employees to move between firms are much
lower than the costs of individuals moving jurisdictions or voting out incumbent
politicians.102
The discipline of political elections is at much greater intervals, so it
reflects the judgment of voters in a lumpy fashion, as opposed to hiring and firing
decisions, which happen daily for firms. This lumpiness means not only that
political outcomes will lag citizen preferences, but also that nanny issues may get
lost in the numerous factors that influence elections when they come. The point is
obvious, but to see it, imagine that the only constraint on the nanny rules of a
firm was an election of the CEO every four years. This election might be about a
firm’s anti-smoking policy, but it would also likely be about the return to
shareholders, compliance with laws, and other bigger picture issues. Corporate
human resources policies aren’t judged collectively, episodically, and in an
aggregated fashion, but are evaluated every time the firm interacts with its
employees or the labor market.103 In short, CEOs are also constantly evaluated by
the labor market in ways that politicians generally are not.
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Second, corporate managers are compensated with high-powered
incentives tied to the firm’s economic performance, which in turn will be
influenced by continual feedback of labor (and, to a lesser extent, capital and
product) markets, which will in turn be impacted by any nanny rules. So if a firm
implements an anti-smoking policy that raises labor costs without offsetting
increases in productivity or reduced health care expenses, and thus puts the firm
in a worse cost position vis-à-vis competitors, this can be expected to reduce the
firm’s financial performance and therefore managers’ compensation. It is, of
course, possible that this negative will be offset by other moves the firm makes,
say launching a great new project, but analysts and investors incorporate all firm
information into stock prices, so increased labor costs will make the firm worse
off than it would be otherwise, and this will be reflected in the firm’s value.
Politicians are, in contrast, paid a flat fee, and their pay is not tied directly
in any way to the efficiency of any nanny policy. A similar mistake in the
implementation of a government-imposed no smoking policy may generate
political discontent, but unless it reaches some critical mass, it is not priced by
the political market. Politicians do see the impact of their votes (in the aggregate)
in the fund raising market. Those with views popular with moneyed interests
(either individuals or groups) will find they are more likely to hold on to their
seats and will have more money to pass out to help others get elected, thus
improving their status within the party. This market is unlikely to be highly
responsive to the feedback on nanny laws, however, since there are many political
sides of nanny issues for politicians that they can use to extract contributions.
The existence and intensity of these sides need not be correlated with the social
cost of a particular nanny policy. The ACLU and tobacco companies or fast food
firms may press strongly for anti-nanny legislation in ways that dominate other
interests. In other words, market prices are continual distributions, while
political prices are lumpy ones, which by definition provides more slack for
mistakes.
3. Legal restrictions
Firms also face much more stringent legal restrictions on their conduct
than government entities deploying nanny rules. Unfaithful or inept agents are
subject to greater legal risk if they are firm managers than politicians. Firm
managers are subject to a panoply of legal regimes designed to insure their
fidelity to the owners of the firm (that is, the shareholders). For instance,
managers can be sued by the firm or the firm’s owners for breach of various
directly to net losses in population, and even if this is possible, it is only likely to be significantly attenuated
from the decision, and thus a much less powerful signal.
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fiduciary duties, be subjected to SEC enforcement proceedings, and be indicted
for any criminal conduct, such as diverting shareholder monies for personal use.
In contrast, the only meaningful constraint on political behavior beyond elections
is criminal charges for bribery. The burden of proof is higher in criminal cases,
and this coupled with the fact that there is no private right of action against
politicians, means there are relatively few cases compared with corporate
litigation to police behavior.
Existing state law also will protect against the worst potential abuses of
nanny rules by opportunistic agents. Consider, for example, an employee whose
pension is about to vest and is fired on the ground that her smoking habit is
inconsistent with a newly enacted firm policy against employing smokers. Two
well-established bodies of law, one state and one federal, make this kind of
opportunism illegal and untenable for firms. The federal pension law, ERISA, for
example, explicitly prohibits firms, even in at-will regimes, from engaging in
employment decisions that would deprive individuals of federally guaranteed
pensions.104 In addition, state common law, even in at-will regimes, clearly
provides for relief in situations in which monies or benefits that are already
earned are taken from employees under the guise of employment decisions.105
There is some state-by-state variation in what counts as “earned,” with some
states holding that bonuses or contractual promises—e.g., an increase in
compensation after remaining at a firm for a certain period—are protected from
firm opportunism. So, at the least, employees should feel at least as well
protected from nanny rules being used as an end run around their employment
rights in their state or federal law regime as they would if there were no nanny
rules.
B. More and Better Tailoring
A second advantage of corporate nannies compared with state ones is that
the rules are more likely to be narrowly tailored, that is, to impose costs on
individuals in amounts equal (or nearly so) to the costs these individuals impose
on others (be they shareholders or other citizens). Information about the efficacy
and efficiency of nanny rules is relayed to corporate managers much more
frequently than through political elections and with much greater power than it is
for politicians making similar decisions in light of managers’ high-powered
incentives. These two arguments can be thought as the frequency and amplitude
of the feedback loop.
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Firms use nanny rules to reduce specific costs of the firm, such as health
care costs, labor costs, or legal risk. When rules are imposed, the impact on costs
is felt quickly and readily observable by the firm’s managers. The discipline is not
just binary (have or do not have) but continuous, since the feedback loop from
markets will give the firm’s managers precise information about the impact of the
rules. For example, a no-smoking policy will quickly impact a firm’s operating
costs. The policy will almost certainly lower insurance costs, but it will
undoubtedly have other effects as well. It may cause the firm’s wages to rise, as
the firm may have to pay more to attract workers who will be subject to the policy
(and are uniquely valuable to the firm) or who put some value on employers not
having these rules. These latter employees may be concerned about their
externality-causing behaviors being captured by future rules or believe that the
nannyism signals something else unattractive about the firm—say, a low
tolerance for shirking. Pointing in the other direction, the firm’s productivity may
increase as the result of healthier and happier employees, say be reducing
absenteeism caused by smoking-related illnesses.
The cause and effect will be highly salient for a firm’s managers, who are
compensated based on defined metrics, which are highly sensitive to the
outcomes of nanny rules. This is likely true up and down the hierarchy. For
example, a human resources manager may be paid a cash bonus based on the cost
efficiency of her management of the firm’s health care budget, and therefore will
have the right incentives to force employees to internalize the costs they impose
on the firm. And, at the top, the CEO’s pay, which is highly correlated with firm
financial performance, will highly sensitive to the aggregate impact on firm costs
and performance.
Politicians may have some of the similar aims (improving health in a
jurisdiction), but face no similar optimization constraint. Politicians are not
incentivized to optimize rules, but merely get them right enough to satisfy enough
voters to win an election or garner enough political support for horse-trading of
various sorts. For the saliency reasons mentioned above, this fact means political
nannyism is unlikely to be well calibrated, since there is likely to be nothing but a
very crude voter check on the accuracy of nanny rules.
There is an information or data component of this, an error component,
and an accountability component, and private parties are likely to outperform
their public counterparts in each. In terms of information, the government is not
trading off directly against wages and productivity, so it will be more difficult to
quantify metrics against which to measure the costs of nanny rules. For example,
a no-smoking policy imposed by the government would be designed to improve
overall health of the smoking citizenry, perhaps measured by total health care
expenditures they add, but there is a very complicated tradeoff here in knowing
the social externality. Most obviously, health care costs of a particular
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jurisdiction, be it federal, local, or state, will represent only a share of the total
costs, and thus jurisdictions will not have perfect incentives to adopt the right
level of control. Third-party insurance could solve this problem to some extent,
since the insurers would presumably adjust premiums to reflect their best
estimates of the costs of various behavioral choices. But this kind of pricing
function likely only exists for non-government insurers, since these prices are the
only ones set by market forces.
Firms are also likely to see the benefits of behaviors in ways that
governmental entities will not. There may be, for example, an upside (say,
increased cognitive function and thus productivity) from smoking. Firms will see
this benefit directly and be able to weigh it against the increased health-care and
other costs that smokers impose on the firm. The state, which also pays for
substantial health care costs, sees the downside from a ban, but the upside from
smoking is non-existent or much more attenuated. A smoker-friendly jurisdiction
might attract workers in industries where this productivity difference is large,
and this might increase the size and efficiency of the tax base. But unless these
gains are very large or distributed fairly evenly across the jurisdiction (both of
which are unlikely), the gains from a smoking ban will swamp any offsetting
benefits from a smoker-friendly policy. This is an especially likely outcome
because of the nature of electoral politics discussed above. There is no reason to
believe that industries in which there would be these types of benefits will be
powerful, especially since there are likely to be businesses pitted against
businesses, workers pitted against workers, and so on.
This discussion points to another corporate advantage—sorting by
employees will be better than sorting by citizens, thus allowing optimization of
rules and a lower cost of deploying nanny rules. Blanket rules, be they by firm or
by jurisdiction, will be easier to implement, but have the downside of being
overinclusive or underinclusive. Effective sorting, however, can help solve this
problem—firms where smokers impose no externalities or where the gains from
smoking exceed the costs can hire smokers, while those where they do can refuse.
It is much more difficult for cities and states to do this. Smaller jurisdictions will
be better along this dimension, ceteris paribus, but since firms are generally
smaller than political subdivisions, this means nanny rules are less likely to be
overinclusive or underinclusive. Firms are also more likely to attract individuals
with similar preferences on particular issues, like smoking, eating, or other
health-related issues. Firm cultures—being healthy, loving the outdoors, etc.—are
routinely advertised to the labor market; it is much more difficult for cities, which
are larger and more diverse, to do this.
Not only will firms have better and more continuously updated
information in the form of feedback from markets, they also will have an
advantage in their ability to correct the inevitable errors that will be part of
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optimizing programs designed to reduce or eliminate externalities. As noted
above, the calculations about what causes externalities, how big they are, and
what the best way to reduce them given the heterogeneity of individual utility
functions and the inevitable unintended consequences of these kinds of
judgments, are likely to be impossible to make in the abstract. Trial and error is
the only possible method of achieving the optimal rules, especially when
conditions will be highly localized.106 Along this dimension, firms are bound to be
far superior because, among other things, of the dispersal of decision making
authority—individual managers are making finely tuned labor market decisions
constantly that get immediate feedback from the market—and the greater
number of individuals and firms creating and testing rules.
One example of this is the possibility that anti-bad behavior policies may
backfire by encouraging individuals to engage in the conduct being discouraged.
There are stories suggesting that this is the case for government policies banning
smoking or drinking alcohol. Firm nanny rules may not suffer from this problem,
since they will not be legal bans but merely corporate policies, which may not
generate the same rebellious reaction. In addition, if the reaction does obtain in
the corporate context, firms will be able to adapt more quickly by altering or
eliminating the nanny rule.
Not only will feedback be better, but the ability to respond to market
signals will be easier and faster. Firm decisions are made by fiat: what the CEO
says goes. This means nanny rules can be deployed, changed, and abandoned
with much greater frequency and ease. The more general point here is that the
lower the transaction costs in using and adjusting nanny rules, the more
responsive they are likely to be to efficiency concerns. Dictators would have this
advantage in the political realm, as would smaller governments and jurisdictions,
where decision making is quicker and less costly. There will, of course, be some
slack in the feedback loop because the costs of monitoring firms is not zero. The
relevant question is not whether firms are perfect along this dimension, but
instead better compared with the alternatives. (The potential that slack may be
greater in the aggregate for corporate nannies than government ones is discussed
below.)
C. Broader Scope
A third advantage of corporate nannies is the ability to more easily
implement nanny rules that cover behavior at all times, and thus more likely to
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cause internalization of all costs by individuals. A state or local government could
ban smoking in public places or even in one’s home, but this would not prevent
smoking in non-covered locations and, given limited and imperfect enforcement
mechanisms, would not fully impose externalities on smokers. State-imposed
nanny laws are, for this reason, likely to be broad but shallow—they can cover
every individual with one law, but this law will be temporally and spatially
limited. In contrast, a firm can adopt a policy that would capture smoking done at
any time and place by requiring individuals to be non-smokers as a condition of
employment or imposing on smokers an increased health insurance premium or
other cost. The rule would be narrow but deep, in that it would be only one
employer but would cover all incidence of smoking. Whether a series of narrow
and deep corporate rules improves social welfare more than a broad but shallow
law is an empirical question. But corporate rules are likely to be more effective if
widely adopted. There may be, however, barriers to widespread adoption
(discussed below) or duplicative costs from this method of deployment. This
discussion merely highlights this advantage of corporate nannyism, all else being
equal.
1. Broad government policies
The government can, of course, write laws that are broad and deep. It is
not obvious, however, that this is superior to a narrow and deep strategy
deployed by many firms. There are two general ways in which the government
can write broad and deep laws. First, the government could ban the behavior and
enforce the ban with civil or criminal penalties. Returning to the example of
smoking, the state could simply outlaw the manufacture, sale, and use of tobacco
products. This approach does not preserve choice, however, and in a world with
heterogeneous preferences among individuals and imperfect information, is
likely to be suboptimal for that reason, except in cases where the benefits are
clearly dwarfed by any potential benefits and there are or are likely to be close
substitutes for the behavior. (A ban on the sale of trans fats might be a good
example of a compelling case that meets this criteria.) Mistakes, which may be
inevitable given the complexity of these issues, will be much more costly in the
case of bans, if for no other reason than socially beneficial choices will be
unavailable for some period of time. In addition, bans may give rise to more
negative unintended consequences. The experience with the ban on alcohol
during the Prohibition era provides a ready example of how social policy of this
sort is plagued by the potential for unintended consequences to overwhelm any
benefits of the ban, and how individuals’ long-standing preferences are not easily
manipulated by governments.
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The other manner in which the government can be both broad and deep is
the use of penalties, better known as (Pigovian) taxes. A tax on a pack of
cigarettes penalizes smoking no matter where or when the smoker chooses to
smoke. At first taxes seem like an elegant solution, since in addition to spatial and
temporal benefits, they can be adjusted, can be used in experiments to estimate
optimal levels, and they can be tailored to optimal levels based on different levels
of enforcement by the government. There are numerous problems with the use of
taxes in both theory and practice, however, that dramatically limit their
effectiveness and efficiency in this context.
2. Shortcomings of government taxes
a. Setting the tax
First, for taxes to work well at internalizing individuals’ externalities, they
must be set at the right level—that is, at approximately the level of the total social
cost imposed by each individual. There are, however, no easy answers to the
questions of which actions impose externalities, what the size of these
externalities are, or what the impact of internalization will be on unobservable
elements of individual utility functions. In other words, decision costs and error
costs are likely high when third parties make assessments about externalities,
especially when, as noted above, the feedback from externality estimates to actual
costs and benefits is noisy or impossible to quantify.
A simple example of this can be seen in the current debate about the best
solutions to the issue of global warming. The conventional wisdom among
economists is that carbon emissions impose an externality on others, by
contributing to an increase in global temperatures, which it is believed will cause
a litany of harms to befall humanity. There is, however, much dispute about the
existence of these externalities and even more dispute about their size. So while
economists generally support a Pigovian tax on carbon emission to force
internalization of harms caused, there is a huge range in expert valuations of the
needed size of the tax (and thus the estimate of the externality). Consider two
estimates from leading researchers in this area: William Nordhaus argues that a
tax of about $30 per ton of carbon (rising to about $85 in 2050) is about right,
while Nicholas Stern concludes that a tax of about $300 per ton is necessary to
optimize private carbon emissions.107 The merits of this debate are beyond the
scope of this paper; the point here is simply that these calculations are messy and
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highly uncertain, even when millions of dollars and bright minds are at work in
estimating the answers.108
While the scale of most nanny regulations will be smaller and the
calculations less complex, the problems inherent in estimating the actual social or
firm-specific costs from, say, smoking, remain daunting. As noted above,
actuarial tables will reflect some of these, and insurance companies are as well
placed as anyone to make estimates, but the complicated nature of health care
payments in this country, coupled with the other benefits and costs of banning
smoking or eating trans fats, make any attempt to exactly quantify the costs of
behaviors very difficult. This perhaps explains the variation in policies of various
political entities—some, but not all, localities ban “unhealthy” choices, and those
that do choose a wide range of methods and reaches of the programs.
Firms, of course, will face these same problems in designing their own
internal nanny regulations. The difference in expected efficiency is getting the
right answers not through deliberation and study but rather market-based and
market-disciplined experimentation. It is only through repeated experimentation
and tinkering that the optimal Pigovian taxes be discovered. This is especially
true since the calculation involves not only macro issues, like health care costs,
but also localized data and information too, like employee happiness and
productivity. Pigovian taxes implemented by governments could be equally
efficient if set and updated as often, if based on feedback from market
experiences, and if magnified by the high-powered incentives that drive firm
manager conduct. None of these factors, however, obtains in the current process
of setting sin taxes, either at the legislative or executive level.
b. What to tax
Second, the questions about what to tax are significant. Say a government
wanted to reduce obesity through taxation. The most common suggestion is to
tax food; the Twinkie tax discussed above is a classic example. It could tax foods
with lots of sugar or carbohydrates or fats, but these components are only loosely
correlated with weight. Putting aside issues of regressivity and political feasibility
(considered immediately below), it isn’t clear that even an omniscient
government could determine how much to tax a Twinkie in order to optimize
social consumption of them. Food is just one of many inputs that determine
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weight (another important one is exercise), and taxing it alone without
consideration of the others is likely to impose large social costs without clear
benefits. Taxing inputs instead of outcomes is likely to be both over and
underinclusive, and given the other incentives for government tax authorities,
doubtfully correlated with externalities.
Taxing food will also be hopelessly complicated. Food is composed of
numerous ingredients and is not inherently good or bad. A candy bar eaten by an
obese child every day is likely to have one effect, while one eaten by a marathon
runner another, and the tax will thus not likely capture the externalities (positive
and negative) in each case. In addition, the administrative burden in trying to
ascertain the costs and benefits of each food or each ingredient are likely to be
daunting if not impossible. Food taxes, like other taxes, are likely to generate
substantial political opposition, from powerful interests on the supply and
demand side, and especially because any taxes are likely to be highly
regressive.109 Moreover, the inevitable compromises inherent in the tax-setting
process are likely to distort the cost-allocation process from the optimal one,
assuming we could know what that is.
Taxing food may also lead to perverse consequences. Recent research
suggests that the best way to reduce obesity is to lower food prices, not raise
them. Professors Charles Courtemanche and Art Carden find that the presence of
so-called big box retailers (that is, Walmart, Sam’s Club, Costco, etc.) lowers
overall food prices, which in turn increases the consumption of fruits and
vegetables, especially for “women, minorities, urban residents, and the poor.”110
This study simply highlights the difficulty in taxing inputs instead of focusing on
outputs.
Another series of studies supports the argument, by comparing the types
of foods that are healthy and unhealthy. The studies find that energy dense food
is less healthy but also less expensive, while less energy dense foods are more
healthy and more expensive.111 From this, the authors argue that imposing higher
taxes on food, without regard to this tradeoff, would have negative distributional
consequences.
The obvious solution to these problems is to tax weight, since that is what
allegedly imposes social costs. But this may be politically very difficult to do.
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Political consensus would have to be garnered, and it would have to overcome
inevitable interest groups for obese individuals, scientific claims about genetic
predisposition, and socio-economic claims about access to and affordability of
high-quality and healthy foods. The need to achieve political consensus and
resistance to taxes generally are another reason they are likely inferior to
corporate programs. There has been some movement in this direction in other
countries—the United Kingdom is considering a tax on health care rates tied to
body mass index—but it is not a serious part of the current debate on health care
costs here in the US.
Enforceability of a weight tax would also be difficult. One can imagine all
sorts of possible ways of government monitoring of individual weight, but the
real and political costs are likely to be very high. For example, the government
could set up weigh stations, say at federal, state, or local agencies or doctors’
offices, and mandate every individual in a family weigh in before paying their
taxes. The silliness of this idea is reinforced by the fact that almost 40 percent of
the population (and statistically likely to be more obese and to be on the
government’s health care dime) pay no taxes. It also ignores the problem
inherent in single-time weigh-ins: individuals would have incentives to binge diet
before weigh ins, as every pound means dollars. This kind of behavior is unlikely
to be healthy, but would be very likely in this regime. Moreover, testing like this
would inevitably raise Fourth Amendment challenges, since these tests would
arguably be “searches.” Although various types of searches may eventually be
declared “reasonable,” the existence of constitutional rights in the background
raises the cost of developing these programs and of innovation.
Firms in contrast can easily deploy low-cost and regularized mechanisms
for measuring weight (or, more likely, body-mass index), since employees
generally report to an office or place of work each day. In fact, some firms are
already doing this. Stepping on to a scale periodically at work may seem intrusive
to some, but it is far less costly than the government model described above. The
same result obtains for smoking, drug use, or other dangerous activities.
c. Who to tax
Third, broad, state-imposed taxes are regressive, and thus likely to impact
poor individuals more harshly than wealthier ones. For example, assume the
government determines that the social cost of the average individual consuming a
Twinkie or a pack of cigarettes is $2. Wealthy individuals may not alter their
behavior because of the small amount of the tax (leading to underinternalization), while poorer ones will be disproportionately effected. While it is
difficult to say that there can be over-internalization, since presumably no
smoking or consumption of Twinkies might be a good thing, the economic impact
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for poorer individual may be concerning, and therefore help mobilize opposition
to this type of tax regime.
Company-imposed “taxes” on unhealthy or otherwise costly activities
might be regressive too, since flat fees for certain activities would have the same
impact that state-imposed taxes would. But, unlike political taxes, firm penalties
may be easily tailored to the individuals’ wealth in ways that would optimize the
externality tax. For example, firms could impose Pigovian taxes on weight or
smoking or other unhealthy activity by increasing insurance premia for
employees proportional to wage levels. This would be impossible to do with a
Twinkie tax or cigarette tax, since sales of all such products would have to be
taxed differently depending on the buyer’s income. The government could
optimize in the same way firms could by using the tax code instead of sales taxes,
but this would involve general taxes unrelated to specific activities, would involve
steep administrative costs, and, in any event, would not cover many individuals
that pay no income taxes. Firms not only can do this but they have incentives to
do so, since they are not fundraising with nanny taxes but are trying to assign
costs where they arise. If firms over or under-assign these costs, the impact will
be felt in the firm’s labor or other costs.
d. How taxes are spent
Fourth and finally, the money from political taxes can be (and is likely to
be) diverted from paying for the costs imposed by a given activity to pay for some
other government program, and, as a result, the amount of regulation will not be
proportional to the harm caused by the activity, but rather to the political power
of the relevant interest groups. For example, the billions of dollars in settlements
states received from cigarette companies were intended to help offset increased
state medical costs for smokers, but most of these monies were diverted to other
purposes.112 It might be argued that this diversion merely frees up additional
monies that would have been spent on the other purposes to be spent on health.
There is no evidence to support this claim of fungibility, but it is possible. That
said, the argument misses the point. By delinking the raising of monies from the
cost those monies are supposed to offset, the probability that the externality tax
will be set at the socially optimal level is reduced. This is because the tax rate (or
cost imposed) is unlikely to be set correctly at first, and without a linkage
between money in and costs reduced, the feedback effect that would help
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establish the optimal tax rate is lost.113 This feedback is powerful for firms, since
nanny taxes are useful only insofar as they directly offset behavior-specific costs.
If firms charge too much for smoking, labor costs will rise and the firm will be
disadvantaged vis-à-vis other firms. There is also no evidence or reason to believe
managers are using nanny taxes as a way of aggrandizing power or lining their
own pockets. If managers wanted to do this, there are much easier and better
ways.
The argument for the greater accountability of corporate nannies here is
premised on the assumption that what the nanny does with the money ex post
influences the setting of the nanny level ex ante.114 If the costs are not fed back to
the rule-setting mechanism, there is less constraint on agents from taking monies
saved by the nannyism for personal (as opposed to their principals’) use. This is a
familiar agency-cost problem, and the argument here is that agency costs are
lower in the corporate context than the state context, especially when it comes to
the deployment of revenues raised or saved.
Some related problems are that the state may sue to recoup costs that are
ultimately paid by the federal government, and therefore delink the imposition of
costs and benefits. This may also happen within different branches of
government within a particular jurisdiction. A good example of this problem is
seen in the experience of the State of West Virginia’s use of litigation to recoup
the costs imposed by abuse of the drug OxyContin from its manufacturer. The
attorney general of West Virginia appointed four law firms to sue the
manufacturers, ultimately collecting settlements totaling $10 million. The suit
was brought on behalf of West Virginia’s Medicaid program, but the attorney
general’s office kept the $6.7 million that was not paid to the law firms in the
case. According to press accounts, “[t]he federal government, which pays a
significant portion of the state’s Medicaid bills, remains furious the program
received none of the settlement . . ..”115
Firms have not sued for recoupment, and therefore are not susceptible to
the shortcomings of litigation incentives. Instead, firms focus almost entire on ex
ante nanny regulations. And whether firms engaged in this kind of activity or
traditional Pigovian taxes, there is no chance of diversion, since cost savings run
directly to the firm’s bottom line.116 In addition, any monies likely to be
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raised/saved by firms are trivial in comparison to firm value. Accordingly, the
possibility of biasing firm-value decisions, say by sabotaging labor markets to
increase firm revenues, is difficult to imagine, since CEOs have high-powered
incentives to maximize firm value. In contrast, political officials do not have the
same high-powered incentives, and therefore the potential for manipulation and
self-serving conduct is much higher. For example, in the case from West Virginia
above, the attorney general is accused of routing the state’s prosecution of the
case, and $3.3 million in fees, to law firms that helped fund his campaign. In
addition, the amounts at stake (from either settlements or sin taxes) are large
compared with state budgets.117
A related problem is that state-imposed taxes are likely to be much stickier
than corporation-imposed taxes. While a firm can adjust a nanny “tax” on
smokers or skydivers or the obese on a daily basis depending on feedback from
the labor market, idiosyncrasies of individual cases, and new evidence about the
existence and magnitude of externalities, political entities cannot be so nimble.
Removing taxes requires political consensus, which is often difficult to build on
tax issues, especially when the effect will be depriving the jurisdiction of
revenues.118
An example of the potential for diversion, resulting mismatch, and
stickiness of taxes is the current regime in Pennsylvania for taxing alcohol. In
1936, after a major flood killed 24 people and caused millions in property damage
in Johnstown,119 the legislature instituted a temporary tax of 10 percent on all
alcohol sales to raise the $41 million needed to rebuild the city.120 The goal was
achieved five years later, but the tax didn’t die. In fact, it survives today, nearly
seven decades after its purpose was achieved. And it was raised over the years,
standing at 18 percent today. The tax, which raises over $200 million per year, is
not used to offset the externalities from alcohol consumption—e.g., paying for
abuse treatment centers, victims of alcohol-related crimes, etc.—but rather goes
into the general public fisc for legislators to hand out as they see fit. The
delinkage from costs, the tendency to use so-called sin taxes for other purposes,
and the stickiness of this tax all undermine the claim of Pigovian tax efficiency in
the case of nanny laws.
Taxes may be either too low or too high—the point is they are not
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implemented based on actual costs, and therefore are likely to be socially
inefficient. Moreover, it is unlikely that the taxes would be too low. To be sure,
Americans generally abhor taxes, but sin taxes are a notable exception to this
rule, and once sin taxes become sources of general revenue, the only constraints
on them is high-cost political action. As for other potential nanny taxes (non-sin,
non-minority), these are likely to face significant political opposition since people
generally dislike paying taxes. For example, taxes on weight would impact a large
percent of the population, and would therefore likely be opposed by strong
political forces. This obstacle will be much lower for employer-imposed fees or
taxes designed to achieve the same goals. In fact, as discussed above, employer
programs can be disguised in ways that make them more palatable (that is,
carrots instead of sticks) than any potential government program.
D. Greater Experimentation
Increased experimentation in the design and implementation of nanny
rules is another advantage corporate nannies may have over state ones. Given the
uncertainty about the existence and size of externalities, as well as the optimal
way of forcing their internalization, a policy that encourages experimentation
with different types and degrees of nannyism is preferable to a one-size-fits-all
approach. Corporate nannyism is bound to result in more experimentation on the
margin than political nannyism for several reasons. Most obviously, there are
many more firms than political subdivisions, and therefore, assuming a constant
level of innovation and use among all third parties, we would expect this to result
in simply more different nanny rules.
There is also reason to believe that rates of innovation and use will be
much higher among corporations. As discussed below, there are some limits
placed on the reach of nanny rules imposed by federal and state laws, including
constitutional provisions. These laws will fall more heavily on state nannies,
because of the state-actor limit on the reach of constitutional prohibitions. For
example, constitutions in New Jersey, New York, California, and elsewhere define
certain health conditions, like obesity and high-blood pressure, as protected. This
limits the ability of states somewhat, either in law making or in employment
considerations, to engage in externality discrimination. Private employers are not
as obviously affected by this limitation since no state action is generally involved
in private business decisions. (Some state statutes and constitutional provisions
apply specifically to private employers.)
Innovation is likely to be much higher in private firms for another
reason—the lack of a need for broad political consensus to enact nanny
regulations. Political entities in this country are democracies, while firms are
dictatorships. While a majority of legislators (and thus the population) in a
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particular jurisdiction must support a new nanny rule, firms can implement new
rules without debate, explicit approval from those effected, and without a vote of
owners. Building a political consensus on, say, banning smoking in a jurisdiction,
is costly, in that legislators must first educate themselves on the issues, then
convince their constituents and each other about the merits of the ban, and
finally manage the interest group struggle that such a ban will surely engender.
The time, money, and political capital necessary to achieve consensus on nanny
issues is undoubtedly significant. Especially compared with how a firm would
approach the same rule. Shareholders vote (by selling shares) not on corporate
policies but corporate outcomes. This means that there is no input on
employment policies by either workers or owners, but merely a check on them
based on market reactions (of either labor costs or share price). Since the
accountability check is ex post rather than ex ante, there will be, ceteris paribus,
more experimentation.
The point made above about the cost of nanny rules hitting a firm’s bottom
line quickly and clearly also points in the direction of more experimentation.
When decision makers have feedback about what works and what doesn’t work
they are more likely to engage in numerous small experiments, since the impact
can be measured and good policies adopted and expanded, while bad policies are
abandoned. Since managers are insulated by and large from removal for
mistakes, unless they serious impact firm earnings or are not made in good faith,
and since managers’ compensation is highly correlated with outcomes, this also
supports experimentation. To be sure, politicians can take polls, both ex ante and
ex post, on the desirability of nanny rules. Politicians may not want to wait for ex
post polls, since the damage to reputation may already have been done, and ex
ante polls may not be as informative about true preferences. In addition, it is not
clear that polling is an effective way of measuring the efficiency of rules intended
to internalize costs. It may be that a majority of individuals in a jurisdiction
favors a smoking ban, simply because they do not like the smell of smoke, but the
ban might impose large dead weight losses on society. In the corporate context,
where labor costs would be immediately impacted by a similar ban, the
identification of costs and benefits of the policy would be more obvious.
A final point about experimentation is worth mentioning—firms are likely
to adopt “good” nanny rules deployed by other firms. Corporate policies will be
publicly disclosed, and this will allow other firms to adopt policies that work.
And, since competitors will want to match cost-saving policies, and firms in other
industries will want to lower costs as well, efficient nanny rules will be copied
quickly and ubiquitously. There will no doubt be copying by political jurisdictions
too, and we have seen some of this as smoking bans and other nanny laws have
proliferated over the past few years. Given the point above about political
consensus, it would be not unreasonable to suggest that corporate nanny rules
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will be more viral than state ones. But, at a minimum, there is no reason to
believe corporate cascades will be less likely than political ones.
E. Better Monitoring
In terms of practically designing and enforcing nanny rules, firms may
have a significant advantage over the state when it comes to monitoring
individuals, since most employees are physically at their place of employment for
many hours per day. Imagine a state and a firm that both want to charge
individuals differential health care premiums based on their body mass index.
(The United Kingdom, which pays health costs for all citizens out of tax revenues,
has considered this, as have several private American corporations.) While the
firm can require employees to literally step on the scale at set or random intervals
when they come to work, the state would have to additionally mandate doctor
visits at the same intervals or send health inspectors to individuals’ homes to
enforce the policy. This would add enormous costs to the health care system,
which may even swamp the benefits of the internalization effort in the first place.
Although the idea of health inspectors visiting homes sounds Orwellian, some
governments are doing exactly this. Taiwan deploys inspectors to check up on
individuals who meet certain criteria established by the national health
authorities.121
To be sure, the monitoring advantage will depend on the type of nanny
regulation. The state may have monitoring advantages for certain types of
regulations for three reasons. First, the state has already deployed numerous
government officials, like police officers, who may be better positioned to
monitor certain activities. A ban on cell phone use while driving is a good
example of when this is probably true. The police, or more and more traffic
cameras, are a more effective and efficient way to enforce this rule than if
individual firms deployed a redundant force to monitor employees while driving
to and from work and on off days. Some firms have a no-cell-phone-while-driving
policy, but these likely piggyback on state or local ordinances, in that individuals
getting tickets for this may face job consequences. There are some cases in which
firms have actually fired individuals for violating this policy, without any state
involvement.122 But these are likely to be rare and serve more as a statement of
principles or a very weak deterrent.
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When evaluating nanny rules along the dimension of deterrence, it is
important to keep in mind that the state has an advantage in the type and severity
of penalties it can impose. And since deterrence is simply the product of the
probability of detection and the expected penalty, the state can, ceteris paribus,
achieve greater deterrence. The state can imprison violators of nanny rules, while
firms can impose only quasi-fines or loss of employment. This means that the
state can get more deterrence with less enforcement/monitoring costs. Whether
this balances out the dramatically reduced monitoring costs for firms described
above will depend on the type of nanny rule—in some cases (like the cell phone
ban) will, while in others (obesity rules) it may not.
Although a characterization of which nanny rules are more efficiently
provided by the state and which by private firms is beyond the scope of this
paper, some boundaries are clear. It would be difficult for a firm to monitor
whether individual employees are consuming trans fats sold by restaurants or
food companies; it would be much less costly and more effective to simply ban
the use of trans fats in foods. On the other hand, charging smokers higher
insurance premiums is something firms can do much more efficiently, since they
can easily test individuals at work randomly for smoking. (The state could try to
achieve the same result through the use of Pigovian taxes on smoking, but, as
discussed above, this is unlikely to be as efficient as corporate efforts.)
We can be confident that firms will choose to implement nanny rules
where they have some comparative advantage or can free ride on the efforts of
the state. In this way, corporate nannyism is likely to be a compliment to, rather
than substitute for, state nannyism. In other words, there is a market of sorts for
the provision of nanny rules, and insofar as the playing field is level, we should
expect the market to sort rules efficiently.
F. Less Politics
A final suite of benefits of corporate nannyism arises because they involve
fewer political considerations, meaning outcomes are more probable and less
likely to be abused by powerful political interests. The first of these is the
practical advantage that comes from the fact that there is an existing and fairly
powerful political movement devoted to restraining the nanny state. As
mentioned above, political consensus is needed to adopt state nanny rules,
whereas CEOs can adopt them via fiat. And there are political forces strongly
opposed to extensions of state nannyism. There are numerous websites,
magazines, and books devoted to nothing but resisting the nanny state. David
behavior. In a recent case, International Paper paid over $5 million to settle a claim that its employee using
a cell phone while driving caused an accident in which a woman lost an arm. See Janet Conley, “Cell
Phone Use in Car Leads to $5.2 Million Payout by Employer,” Law.com, Feb. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202815251120.
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Harsanyi’s recent expose—“The Nanny State”—is typical of this genre, as is
“Reason” magazine, and for that matter the Libertarian Party. Even when antinannyism is not central, it is often significant. A large number of articles and
positions taken by right-leaning commentators, scholars, think tanks, and
politicians contain a healthy dose of libertarian thinking on state regulation of
individual behaviors.
No such thing currently exists for corporate nannyism, so it is simply
easier at this point for firms to adopt nanny rules. Proposed extensions of nanny
rules in the political sphere are met with resistance politicians, interest groups,
and commentators on the other side of the issue; there are no analogs that
consistently oppose corporate nannyism. There have been some attempts to push
back against nanny efforts by firms to date, but these have been small,
disorganized, timid, and largely unsuccessful compared with resistance to state
analogs.
Some individual employees have filed lawsuits to contest nanny rules or
particular outcomes (usually getting fired), but these rarely succeed. (These cases
are discussed more fully below.) Where these cases do succeed, there is usually
some state statute or constitutional provision that undergirds the argument; this
is another type of push back, as discussed above. Although law can be useful in
this regard, it is by far the exception and not the rule when the current landscape
of corporate nannyism is examined.
Since employee acquiescence in corporate nannyism may be in part caused
by a collective action problem, unions or collective bargaining would seem to
provide a potential counterweight. As a practical matter, unions are far weaker
today than they were just a few decades ago, representing just 8 percent of the
non-governmental workforce compared with 35 percent in 1940.123 So even if one
expected the degree of corporate nannyism to vary based on the level of
unionization in an industry or across firms, unions would provide very little
break on this trend given their relatively weak position overall in the economy.
This weak position means that even unionized firms may be able to impose nanny
rules with low costs/resistance, since their relative competitive position will drive
employment policies. In other words, firms will either impose nanny rules to
force individuals to internalize costs or, if they cannot because of union push
back, reduce some other form of employee compensation. Since this latter tactic
is likely to apply across the board, the existence of unions will lead, on the
margin, to a subsidy for cost externalizers.
Another political consideration that cuts in favor of corporate nannyism is
the potential for nannyism to pervert the political process. This might happen in
several ways. For one, money raised/saved from nanny regulations can be
123
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diverted from its intended purpose to other purposes that satisfy the preferences
of legislators or other constituencies. Since agency costs are undoubtedly higher
in the political environment, this risk is especially likely to arise. If this happens,
it not only may cause an inefficient level of nannyism, but it also may erode
public confidence in the political process, at least for the constituencies that are
not benefiting from the redirection. The examples cited above about the West
Virginia Attorney General diverting funds from nanny settlements and the
example of the misallocation of cigarette settlements are just two of the many
examples of this and how the negative effect it can have.
Ironically, if these opportunities for rent seeking by political actors arise,
this may lead to under-deterring nanny rules. For example, if the state imposes a
Pigovian tax on cigarettes and this tax becomes a source of significant revenue for
the state, the state may have suboptimal incentives to set the right level of the tax.
Once the behavior becomes a profit source, the state has the incentive to optimize
the return from the behavior, not to minimize the social costs of the behavior. It
may be, for instance, that banning the sale of cigarettes is socially optimal, but
politicians would have an incentive to keep it legally solely for the money.
This possibility is impossible to imagine in the case of firm-based nanny
rules, which are not about raising revenue but reducing costs, are not divertible
(since there is but one bottom line and firm managers are constrained by legal
duties and reputation from expropriation), and would be competed away in labor
markets if excessive. In addition, unlike other firm policies, cost reductions
through nanny rules cannot be used to raise barriers to entry or create otherwise
anticompetitive positions.
IV.

OBJECTIONS AND DISADVANTAGES

This section raises some potential objections and limits on corporate
nannyism.
First, the tailoring feedback loop may not work if firms are monopsonists
in the labor market. This is just another way of saying that nannyism will be well
calibrated only when there are restraints on the power of the rule setter. This is
true whether the nanny is the firm or the government. If either party has a
monopoly over labor or citizenship, there is less restriction on what they can do
and therefore more possibility of abuse or errors going uncorrected.
No employer, however, has sufficient leverage in the labor markets to
impose costs on employees without risk for the employer. Unlike in product
markets where firms can conceivably have monopoly positions, there are no firms
who are the only one that can employ particular skills. Microsoft utterly
dominates the personal computer market, but computer engineers and
programmers have innumerable other options, including rival firms, different
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computer industries, the government, academia, and self-employment. The
examples of the company towns described above provide nice support for this
claim. Despite the remote location of these towns and much less robust labor
markets (due to higher transportation costs, less labor market mobility, fewer
employers, less skilled labor, macroeconomic conditions, and so on), company
towns found they could not get away with arbitrary rules that did not reflect the
preferences of their employees.124
Second, corporate rules may not take into consideration all the relevant
costs and benefits of their policies. The government must, as a matter of political
necessity, take into consideration the benefits of smokers in ways that are
broader than firms, and if these are large, government nannyism might be more
effective on the margin. One reason why firms do not fully internalize the social
costs of their rules is the existence of government welfare policies. Since firms do
not pay all of the health care costs of employees over the lifespan of the employee,
and since health care problems from particular ailments may arise after firm-paid
insurance lapses, firms may not have the optimal incentives to deter particular
behaviors. For example, the federal government pays most health care for
workers over the age of 65 through an effectively mandatory Medicare plan.125
This means that firms can put some health care costs onto the federal
government, and therefore are not incentivized at the proper level to reduce
behaviors to the optimal level. To solve this problem, one would have to do away
with government subsidies or charge differential amounts based on behaviors or
conditions.
Liberty interests are another example. Of costs that may not be captured in
firm-based calculations. Citizens, whether they engage in the targeted behavior or
not, may value the liberty interest inherent in choice. These are very difficult to
measure in the abstract, to aggregate, or to trade off. Some of these values and
concerns will be part of firm-level calculations, as regulated by the labor market.
Happiness, for one, will be something integral to a firm’s calculation of the intrafirm social welfare calculation. Others, like liberty interests, however, will not be
relevant, except insofar as they impact employee utility directly and in ways
observable by firms. If these interests are significant, labor markets should force
firms to take them into consideration. After all firms already spend considerably
to satisfy employees’ non-monetary preferences. For example, firms offer
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pleasing work environments, fringe benefits, support services, company picnics,
and numerous other things designed to make employees happier in their work
and lives. To be sure, these are selfish acts on the part of the firm to increase
productivity, but they are directly in response to individuals’ demands for
happiness at work. A smoking ban, say one that included smoking at any time,
that would alienate workers and make them feel unfairly monitored by their firm
would be no different than the firm failing to provide comfortable chairs—
workers will leave the firm or demand higher wages to offset the loss of utility.
Market constraints may work well where the non-monetary utility is
sufficiently large for individuals to factor into employment decisions on the
margin,126 but may not where the interests are collectively large but individually
small. This is the familiar collective action problem, and it may inhibit the ability
of labor markets to clear these preferences of individual employees. In these
cases, however, there remain political backstops that can account for these
preferences. Unions, legislatures or courts can intervene to recognize and protect
interests that are not relevant to firm employment decisions but that impose
costs on society. Here the law merely acts to internalize to the firm the negative
externalities it is imposing on society by not taking into account individual
preferences in its attempt to internalize to the individual employee its costs
imposed on the firm. For example, citizens in a particular jurisdiction may value
the freedom from monitoring of their private lives very highly, but not enough for
any individual to resist monitoring by an employer. In this case, there may be
political pressure to restrict this kind of monitoring by employers. There is a
danger that this type of political check will be used in ways that unbalance the
playing field in the direction of state power and state provision of paternalism,
since this enables the state (and the politicians that run it) to keep power, extract
campaign contributions from lobbyists and citizens, and so on. In addition,
political consideration may inevitably represent concentrated political interests—
this is part of the “Bootleggers & Baptists” or “Cigarette Vendors and
Constitutional Defenders” problem. This question is considered below.
Third, there is the possibility that if firm nanny rules are widely deployed,
the sum of error costs (in the feedback loop) will be greater than those in the
political context. This is an application of the Hand Formula to nannyism: many
corporate rules with small error costs may exceed a few political rules with larger
error costs. This is an empirical question that cannot be answered in the abstract.
At this time, however, there are many more political rules than corporate ones,
and it seems like there is convergence between what political and corporate
forces want to regulate. This was true in the era of company towns, when both
corporate and government owners acted similarly, and there is every indication
126
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that the things one is interested in regulating—smoking, obesity, dangerous
activities—the other is as well.
Fourth, there is a risk that the kind of corporate nannyism defended in this
argument will be extended to invidious or otherwise unacceptable forms of
discrimination, such as “no-Republicans” or “no-homosexuals” policies. Although
some employees or citizens may have a preference for this kind of
discrimination,127 society may reasonably want to discourage individuals from
acting on their preferences for this type of discrimination, because it is actually
not demanded or because the cost borne by the individuals discriminated against
exceeds the benefits of those doing the discrimination. There are some examples
in the case law and press about firms firing individuals for such things as
adultery,128 but the nanny rules as defined in this paper are different. This type of
discrimination is not part of the “market for paternalism” because it is not
inevitable: governments cannot engage in this kind of discrimination because of
existing statutes, and therefore the arguments about competition with firms does
not obtain. Only those behaviors that directly lead to costs and are provided by
both the government and private firms are those covered by this argument.129
Moreover, where there is invidious discrimination, on its face or in its impact, the
government can intervene, either with a statute or judicial doctrine, to limit firm
opportunism or abuse.130 Thus attempts to use cost internalization as a pretext
for satisfying preferences for racial, gender, or other socially destructive forms of
discrimination are illegal or can easily be made so. If the class of invidious
discrimination is expanded, to, say, obesity, it should be recognized that this will
crowd out private provision of nanny rules, which may reduce the efficiency of
social policies designed to control them.
A fifth potential objection is that some nanny programs couched in
voluntary terms may be more coercive for lower-income employees. According to
Mark A. Rothstein, director of the Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law
at the University of Louisville School of Medicine, current corporate nannyism
amounts to a “tax that some of the lower-paid workers perhaps can't afford.”131
The regressivity problem exists with any cost-bearing rules, however, whether a
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firm or the state is imposing them. Unless one has a theory about why the
political process is more likely to avoid this problem than the labor market, the
argument fails. And certainly society’s experience with certain sin taxes, which
fall disproportionately on the poor, are an example of government failure in this
regard. While firms will not always get it right or be superior to governments in
this regard, as discussed above, there are ways firms can adjust policies and pay
to take account of these problems in ways it would be difficult for political entities
to do.
A sixth objection might be that costly behaviors by individuals are not
correlated, and that there may be a benefit from merely letting one individual’s
cost-imposing behavior cancel out another’s. So, if all employees were either, say,
smokers or obese skydivers, the costs imposed on each group on the other would
be offset, and therefore the efficient strategy would be not impose any costshifting scheme. This scenario is possible, but seems highly unlikely. Risky
behaviors, either health or activity related, are likely correlated, so that the
employees can be roughly divided into cost bearers and cost imposers. In any
event, if it is true, firms are likely well positioned to figure this out, and, are more
likely than governments to be able to discriminate against employees by group
when it isn’t true.
A final potential objection is the question of whether the potentially
corrosive impacts of nannyism on individual and social wellbeing that have been
documented are worse in the corporate or political context. Immanuel Kant
described the potential dark side of nannyism in his 1784 essay, “An Answer to
the Question: ‘What is Enlightment?’”132 Kant argued that the objects of
nannyism were living in a perpetual state of “immaturity,” which in turn created
a caste of “guardians” who would act opportunistically and to the detriment of the
governed. The end result was a society of “docile creatures” and “autocratic
despotism and profiteering or power-grabbing oppression.”133 Kant’s critique is
in accord with latter criticisms of collectivism by F.A. Hayek and others.134 But it
applies not only in cases of mass nannyism, but also in microcases, like at the
firm level.
The experience at some company towns demonstrates Kant’s concerns. In
a description of company towns in the West, James Allen concludes that
“employees frequently neglected their yards and houses, having learned to
depend on the company for everything.”135 Kant called individuals in this state
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unenlightened “domestic livestock,” and any society composed of them unable to
flourish. Allen goes on to describe how corporate nannyism as practiced in
company towns also led to suboptimal investments on the part of citizens:
Since the company was supposed to take care of house
maintenance, . . . many residents refused even to care for small
items, feeling almost as if they had been cheated if they did some
work which the company out to . . . do.
Perhaps more perversely, nannyism also created a creep toward equal outcomes,
regardless of merit or even need. Allen quotes an official from the company town
of Hannah, Wyoming, on the demand for company-supplied equality:
If we did something for Mrs. Jackson, we could almost be our
bottom dollar that the next morning Mrs. Tacalon, or Scarapelli,
would be there wanting the same identical things, even though they
didn’t need it.
Benefits became obligations when dissociated from the typical decisions of
individuals operating in a world of scarcity.
The inefficiency of the collectivist urge was something that some firms
managed well, while others, like Pullman’s company town, did not. Given the
state of society at the time, Allen concludes that “[p]aternalism was a necessity . .
. but one which most would gladly eliminate when all economic factors permitted
such a move.”136 The parallel to modern corporate nannyism is direct and abt.
Firms might prefer a world in which individuals paid most health care costs or
the state did, and thus relieving them of their obligation to force individuals to
bear the costs of their behavior. While possible, neither of these is likely in the
short-run, given the rather intractable nature of the health care debate in this
country. That said, these two non-firm options are the stated positions of
dominant political parties, and one might eventually be enacted into law in one
form or another.
While firms might prefer this outcome, since it would relieve
them of the hassle of managing nanny programs and the potential risk from
mismanaging them, it might be a negative for society to allow firms to opt out of
the market for paternalism.
There is reason to believe, however, that the nanny state will be worse at
creating docile bodies than the nanny corporation. For one, the state has a
monopoly on physical violence, and therefore individuals that violate state nanny
rules can have their liberty infringed. Although if calibrated correctly, this
increased punishment might simply provide additional deterrence at lower cost
than firms can provide, this result is highly dependent on getting the nanny rules
136
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right. There are, for example, many examples of individuals being jailed for
violating state nanny regulations that seem to represent the influence of those
with political power more than efficient cost internalization methods.137
In choosing the lesser of two evils—worker sheep or citizen sheep—another
reason to favor corporate nannyism is that there are participation benefits in
public life that might be corroded by excessive nannyism by governments. In
other words, a democratic government may rely more heavily on having informed
constituents who are used to educating themselves and making reasoned
decisions than firms. This is because the fear of overextension that Kant worried
about is less likely to come to pass in the corporate context. In addition, the
barriers to adoption are much lower in the case of firms, while the market check
is lower in the case of the government. So if we want lots of nanny rules with
discipline, we should, ceteris paribis, choose corporations as the favored deliverer
of paternalism in the market.
Darrell M
***
These advantages and disadvantages do not point solely in the direction of
favoring corporate nannyism over state nannyism in all or even most cases. The
discussion simply points out some potential advantages and disadvantages of
corporate rules in certain circumstances. Firms might be expected to supply
nanny rules when it is efficient for them to do so, say because of better
monitoring, lower agency costs, or the like, and not to do so when government
rules could be supplied at lower cost for a given efficacy level. So, looking at the
provision of nanny rules in the market for paternalism, it would be reasonable to
conclude that the mix of nanny rules maps to this efficiency. The problem,
however, is that there are government rules, regulations, statutes, constitutional
provisions, and case law that may distort the market from efficiency. It is to this
issue that we now turn.
REGULATION OF NANNYISM

V.

The market for paternalism, like the market for altruism,138 is somewhat
unique, in that the government is both a participant in and regulator of the
market. The risk is that the government will use its power to control how private
firms deploy nanny regulations in order to discriminate in favor of state
regulation based on factors other than the relative efficiency of the state versus
firms in deploying nanny rules. If there are reasons why private firms are likely to
be better or worse than governments in implementing and enforcing nanny rules,
137
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then some bias in favor of one or the other may be justified. The discussion
above, however, shows that there are some potential advantages of corporate
nannies in particular cases, while government nannies may be superior in other
cases. Unfortunately, this section shows that the current regulatory environment
for corporate nannies is both highly uncertain and biased against firm nannies.
Although there have been some recent changes moving in the direction of more
freedom for firms to use nanny rules, the playing filed is still strongly tilted
against corporate nannies.
Regardless of whether a nanny is a corporation or the state, the policy
concerns are the same. The big issues are the sum of decision costs and error
costs in the evaluation of externalities and the implementation of nanny rules;
the magnitude of derivative social welfare losses, such as privacy losses; and the
ability of individuals or groups to impose their own idiosyncratic (and socially
wasteful) preferences on others without sufficient safeguards. All of these are
problems in both private and public context. Unless there is a theory about why
these issues are systematically worse for the private as opposed to public sector,
then government shouldn’t distinguish between the delivery mechanism for
paternalism. This section shows how federal and state law discriminates against
corporate nannies, and how changing these policies could improve social welfare.
A. Codified Law
1. State law
While most states follow the common law employment-at-will regime,
which allows an employee to be terminated at any time with or without cause, 29
states and the District of Columbia have laws on the books restricting the ability
to fire an employee for certain legal, off-duty activities.139 While some the statutes
provide leeway, for example, allowing firms to charge differential insurance
premiums based on tobacco use, the impact of these laws has been to
significantly chill the use of nanny rules by firms. Jack Welch, former CEO of GE,
told a CEO deploying an aggressive nanny program: “Man, you have balls of
steel.” The CEO was puzzled: “[w]hy aren’t the American employers dealing
aggressively with these issues of wellness when they’re the ones footing the bill?”
Answering this question, however, the CEO admits that a “lot of people are
watching to see how badly we get sued.”140 A suit would bring bad publicity,
impose legal costs on the firm, and would, if lost, mean the investments in the
program would be wasted. The hard costs on the downside highlight a central
problem with uncertainty in this area. Firms that innovate in nanny rules will pay
139
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these costs, but will not be able to capture all of the benefits from the innovation,
since other firms can easily copy successful policies.
These so called “lifestyle discrimination statutes” fall into one of two
general categories: those protecting (1) use of lawful products or engaging in legal
activities; (2) tobacco or alcohol only. In the first category, there are a total of ten
states, with five making it unlawful for an employer to treat an employee or
applicant less favorably because of the individual’s off-duty, off-premises use of
any lawful product or lawful consumable product.141 These statutes thus protect
employees who use tobacco, alcohol, or any other “product” that might be
objectionable to an employer. For example, the Illinois Right to Privacy in the
Workplace Act142 bans employment discrimination based on an employee’s or
applicant’s use of lawful products off the premises of the employer during
nonworking hours. Like eight other states with similar statutes143, however, the
statute seems to, but does not clearly, allow employers to pass higher health
insurance costs onto employees who use tobacco.144
Five other states have a broader regime that make it unlawful for an
employer to treat an employee (and in some states, an applicant) less favorably
because of any “lawful activity.”145 Presumably this includes not only the act of
using a lawful product, but also activities unrelated to products, such as
skydiving, engaging in political activities, and so on.
Some states with specific exceptions from lawful activity statutes that
allow companies to charge employees that smoke higher health care insurance
premiums. The nine are: Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North
Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In addition
twenty-two states expressly recognize exceptions based on particular employee’s
job responsibilities (e.g. an employer’s restriction of off-duty smoking by a
cessation-of-smoking coordinator for a local hospital) or the nature of the
employer’s business (e.g., the American Cancer Society’s prohibition of off-duty
smoking).
At the other extreme, the other broad category of statutes are those in
which specific products are signaled out for special treatment. There are 19 states
with statutes prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees who
smoke, meaning they can’t be fired, not hired, paid less, or penalized in any way
141
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for smoking off duty.146 Connecticut’s “smoker’s rights” law is typical:
No employer or agent of any employer shall require, as a condition
of employment, that any employee or prospective employee refrain
from smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his
employment, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment for smoking or using tobacco products outside the
course of his employment, provided any nonprofit organization or
corporation whose primary purpose is to discourage use of tobacco
products by the general public shall be exempt from the provisions
of this section.147
In addition, thirteen states prohibit employers from discrimination against or
regulating individuals using alcohol during non-work hours.148 These statutes
seem to have little purpose other than to interfere with the employment at- will
relationship, unlike Title VII which aims to prevent discrimination on factors
unrelated to business judgment. Twenty states have no statutory protection at all
so employment remains purely at-will, subject to the federal anti-discrimination
acts.
The bulk of the lifestyle discrimination statutes were passed in the early
1990’s, stemming from an interest in protecting employee privacy (particularly
with respect to an employee’s sexual preferences) and forcing employers to base
their decisions on business or performance related reasons. They were initially
passed in “pro-employee” states like California, Illinois and New York as well as
rural Western “pro-privacy” or libertarian states like North Dakota, Nevada,
Montana, and Colorado. After the early 1990’s almost no lifestyle discrimination
statutes were passed until recently when the Michigan House approved a
“Workers Activities” bill in direct response to Weyco’s policy of firing smokers.149
This is another kind of risk, since a seemingly permissive legal regime is always
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subject to change, and any subsequent change would make investments in the
firm’s programs wasteful.
The hodgepodge of state statutes creates a highly uncertain environment
for firms. Even in states in which smoking is explicitly protected as a non-firing
behavior, there remain questions about whether firms can charge smokers
differently for the costs they impose. In addition, for firms with employees in
multiple jurisdictions, firms must set their policies based on the most restrictive
state law. The water is further muddied by the overlay of federal law, various
constitutional protections, and case law interpreting state and federal law. The
next sections take on these issues.
2. Federal law
Three federal statutes speak directly to the leeway granted corporate
nannies. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), provide background rules consistent with a narrow
conception of the role of private nannies. While none of these statutes speak
directly to the deployment of nanny rules by corporations, the language of each
has been used to justify or criticize nanny rules as deployed.
a. HIPAA
The nondiscrimination provisions of HIPAA generally prohibit group
health plans (like those offered by firms) from charging individuals different
premiums or contributions or imposing different deductible, co-payment or other
cost sharing requirements based on a “health factor.” Basically, an employer
paying more for employee A than employee B for health care is prohibited from
passing along that higher cost to A in the form of higher premiums, deductibles,
or co-payments. Since this federal law is supreme, even for private firms, it
provided a strong deterrent for any corporate nanny rules (both carrots and
sticks) that would have the effect of forcing individuals to internalize the costs
they impose on others in group health plans.
There are two narrow exceptions that give firms some leeway in designing
nanny programs. First, if a wellness program offers a reward that is not based on
an individual satisfying a standard related to a health factor, then the program
automatically complies with the nondiscrimination requirements. Examples of
non-health factor programs are: reimbursing gym memberships; participating in
health screenings or diagnostic testing which provides a reward based on
participation and not outcome; a program which encourages preventative care by
waiving the co-payment or deductible requirement for the costs of prenatal care
or well visits; or a program that reimburses smoking cessation classes without
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regard to the result. In other words, providing information or non-judgmental
carrots is protected by HIPAA under a theory that these are the least likely to be
abused; they are, of course, the least likely to be effective too. Companies’
experience with carrots have been disappointing, as voluntary programs do not
force a change in individual incentives.
A second exception tries to ameliorate this limitation. The HIPAA
regulations include an exception to the anti-discrimination rule for “bona fide
wellness programs.”150 The term was, however, undefined for many years,
resulting in no reduction in uncertainty for firms wanting to charge employees
for their conduct. In addition, at least three federal departments—the
Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health & Human Services—were potential
enforcers of firm compliance with HIPAA regulations. This additional complexity
prevented many firms from experimenting with nanny programs, despite the fact
that these departments stated that they would not take any enforcement action
against a firm that sought to comply in good faith with the regulations. This
promise was, according to businesses, cold comfort for the average risk-averse
corporation.151 In other words, standards (instead of specific rules) resulted in
overdeterence, especially since the first firm to test these standards would bear all
of the litigation costs and risks, while other firms could easily copy the result if
successful.
To reduce uncertainty inherent in these standards, in 2001, the
government undertook a rulemaking to “implement and clarify” the term “bona
fide wellness program.” When the proposed HIPAA exceptions were published on
January 8, 2001, the three departments proposed three options of 10, 15, or 20
percent, as the upper limit which employers could charge or reward employees
under a bona fide wellness program. The departments explicitly rejected the idea
of allowing employers to pass on the full cost associated with a health factor
because it “might be so large as to have the effect of denying coverage to certain
individuals” and the administrative burden of the calculations could be too
great.152 The approach finally adopted, however, was simply to remind
companies about the pledge by the three departments not to bring enforcement
actions. Since the pledge was not legally binding and the contours of what would
“bona fide” were highly uncertain, especially in light of conflicting state and
federal statutes and case law, there is no public information about any firms
charging increased health insurance premiums until 2007, when the wellness
program regulation adopted a rule instead of a standard.
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2590.702(f).
151
See http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/aug2007/ db2007081_804238.htm.
152
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note ___.

The Nanny Corporation / 61
Six years later, the rules were finalized and the departments went with a
20 percent limit to give employers “a greater opportunity to encourage healthy
behaviors through programs of health promotion and disease prevention.”153 It
was only when the HIPAA regulations clearly stated that companies could charge
employees up to an additional 20 percent in their premiums for activities like
smoking did firms like Clarian announce policies of charging employees for
smoking, BMIs over 30, and other health violations. Once the uncertainty was
reduced, lots of programs have been announced.
This modest move in the direction of encouraging corporate nannyism is
significant, but limits the ability of firms to charge employees the full costs of the
costs they impose. For example, in 2007, the average health care costs per person
was about $7600,154 but smokers add about $3400 in additional costs and obese
individuals add another $700 per year. Assuming health care insurance
premiums are proportional to costs, this means an obese smoker would have to
be charged over 50 percent more than a non-smoker of average weight to
equalize premiums according to cost. (Smokers alone would have to be charged
over 40 percent more than non-smokers.) But HIPAA limits premium differences
to 20 percent, meaning firms will be unable to force individuals to bear all their
costs, which in turn means that there will be socially inefficient levels of smoking.
It also may lead to a perverse result, since firms may rationally choose to fire
those individuals for whom they cannot charge the full costs of their behavior.
The federal rule, which is designed to protect them, may result in less choice and
lower levels of protection than one that permits firms discretion on how to
charge.
One might argue that the federal limit of 20 percent should simply be
raised to a higher amount, maybe 50 percent, which is the estimate for a sort of
worst-case scenario for destructive personal behavior (that is, an obese smoker).
The problem with this, of course, is that the optimal level is impossible to know in
advance without lots of experimentation, is subject to rapid changes depending
on innumerable circumstances, will likely vary widely by firm and by individual,
and, if set incorrectly, will generate significant under or overdeterrence. A much
better approach would be to allow firms to adapt to local circumstances, update
continuously, and experiment with different programs to find what is effective.
Employers could be checked (imperfectly) by ex post litigation when policies are
used for invidious purposes.
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b. ADA
The ADA, which prohibits employers from discriminating in employment
and benefits against a qualified individual with a disability, may also inhibit
efficient pricing of health externalities.155 The ADA prohibits medical inquiries or
examinations of applicants and employees regarding the existence, nature or
severity of a disability unless it is a job-related. All employees, and not just those
with disabilities, are covered with the ADA and therefore not required to answer
questions about past medical history. Standing alone, these provisions might
provide significant impediments to the kind of high-powered programs that
require health surveys and treat employees with potentially genetic differences
differently.
The ADA, however, excepts most wellness programs if (1) participation is
voluntary, (2) any health information obtained remains confidential and separate
from other employment records, and (3) health information obtained is not used
to limit health insurance coverage eligibility or take adverse employment action.
The voluntariness requirement has been very broadly interpreted by the 7th
Circuit; anything short of “Don Corleone’s ‘Make him an offer he can’t refuse’”
Further limiting the ADA’s applicability to
will be considered voluntary.156
wellness programs is case law, including Supreme Court precedent, holding
remediable addictions, like smoking, not to be a disability within the coverage of
the ADA.157 These requirements are not as strict as the HIPAA wellness program
guidelines, so if a company is adhering to HIPAA, the ADA will likely be satisfied.
Nevertheless, the ADA is commonly used as a cause of action in litigation
arising from nanny rules, and it usually survives a motion to dismiss. This means
implementing firms will bear litigation costs in many, if not all, cases, and thus
deploy fewer rules than they otherwise would in the absence of the law. Getting
this calibration right will be difficult, and it is unlikely that multiple courts
imposing different rules across jurisdictions are likely to come to the most
efficient use of the statute; especially since it seems redundant with other statutes
and not clearly about wellness programs.
c. ERISA
The law protecting pensions and other employee benefits, known as
ERISA,158 may also inhibit free contracting over the allocation of social costs
from employee behaviors. ERISA was enacted to protect the interests of
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employee benefit plan participants by requiring disclosure of financial and other
information to employees, establishing standards of conduct for fiduciaries, and
providing access to federal courts. Its provisions can be used to prohibit
employers from discriminating against employees in benefits or taking action
against them to keep them from receiving benefits entitled to them by federal law
or corporate contract. For example, § 510 makes it unlawful for any employer to
“discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant
... for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the plan.” So an employee who has, say,
pension and health care rights pursuant to a contract with the firm that is
covered by ERISA may be unable to fire or otherwise influence the employee
because of the rights granted by federal law in these benefits.
Very few cases exist on this question, but those that do suggest the
question of whether ERISA applies to nanny rules, like a no-smoking policy, is a
factual question that is not appropriately raised at the motion to dismiss phase.
In a recent federal case from Massachusetts, the district court allowed an ERISA
claim to go to a jury in the case of a new hire who was allegedly dismissed (or, in
the view of the defendant firm, never hired fully at all) for failing to submit to a
nicotine urine test. According to the court, the “section 510 does not apply to
those instances where the loss of benefits was a mere consequence of, but not a
motivating factor behind, a termination of employment . . . And . . . section 510
relates to discriminatory conduct directed against individuals, not to actions
involving the plan in general.”159 Neither of these is capable of resolution at the
motion to dismiss stage, meaning litigation costs in defending plans will be
significant.
d. Other federal statutes
Several other federal statutes are commonly deployed by employees
seeking redress for terminations or other adverse employment events. Most of
these create colorable claims, meaning they have the potential to impose costs on
and therefore be used to extract settlements from employers, but have been
largely unsuccessful in court.160
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, however, provides a greater potential
deterrent to employer nanny programs. Section 504 of the Act prohibits
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discrimination based on any “handicap” in any program receiving federal
monetary assistance.161 Although narrower than the ADA in its coverage of
employers, there is case law suggesting that the scope of potential liability is more
broad. There are state cases interpreting the Act or analogous state provisions
suggesting that (morbid) obesity,162 alcoholism or drug use,163 and nicotine
addiction (that is, smoking) are protected handicaps under the Act, and therefore
cannot be the basis of employment decisions of any kind if the employee is
“otherwise qualified” for the job.
B. Case Law
As evident from the discussion about the interpretation of ERISA, courts
are influential in defining the law in this area, and, it turns out, creating
additional uncertainty and confusion for firms who may want to innovate with
nanny rules. This section briefly surveys 42 cases on health-related employment
actions based on nanny rules over the last four decades. This survey is not a
complete picture of all cases on this subject, but it does include most of the
biggest cases and a fairly drawn sample from all the state and federal cases.
Of the randomly drawn cases in the survey, courts upheld the employer’s
(either a private firm or a governmental entity acting in an employment capacity)
nanny rule about 60 percent of the time.164 Although employers are more likely to
win than lose these cases, this win-rate is sufficient to create a significant amount
of uncertainty about judicial treatment of these programs.
The complaints in these cases involved only state law in about 70 percent
of the cases, with the rest being federal claims or, in one case, both state and
federal causes of action. The federal/state breakdown largely tracks the nature of
the employer in question: 75 percent of the cases brought against private (i.e.,
non-governmental) employers alleged only state law claims, while 65 percent of
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the cases brought against governments as employer alleged only federal law
claims.
1. State law
Although employers win in their defense of nanny rules more often than
not, state common law is replete with cases in which employees have been able to
win back their jobs or get damages for wrongful nanny-based dismissals. There
are four primary theories under which plaintiffs prevail: (1) the lack of a business
purpose; (2) the existence of a protected handicap; (3) the violation of a privacy
interest; or (4) the failure to consider less burdensome alternatives.
First, several cases hold that employer policies, such as banning smoking,
must be in furtherance of a legitimate business purpose. Like business-purpose
tests in other areas of law, this reasoning just begs the question of what is
“legitimate” and what is a “business purpose." The answers are not at all clear on
the face of particular firm policies and there is no codification, so the contours of
permissible and impermissible conduct are found only in state common law
cases. For example, courts in Indiana and North Dakota hold that a private
employer’s ban on employee smoking and drinking during non-working hours
was not reasonably related to the furtherance of the firm’s business.165 A New
Jersey court reached the same conclusion for an employee dismissed because of
obesity.166 The reasoning in these cases is conclusory at best, as they define
“reasonable” based on the outcome of the case—what the court believes is
reasonably related to the firm’s interests can only be gleaned from the result. In
general, however, courts describe off-duty regulations as reasonable only if there
is some direct threat from the conduct to the firm’s business.167 For example, the
Best Lock court cites with approval a case from Wisconsin in which the employer
was able to show that its no-drinking policy was a sine qua non for obtaining
vehicle insurance in its business delivering supplies to taverns, and thus
overcome plaintiff’s discrimination claim.168 This ground of decision should be
sufficient to justify the reasonableness of health insurance cost reducing schemes,
since the argument is nearly identical, but few courts have seen this connection.
Some courts in other jurisdictions do come out the other way. Most courts
uphold the restrictions indirectly. In some cases, the court finds that the behavior
in question spilled over from off-duty to on-duty hours, where every court
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permits the banning of activities such as drinking alcohol or smoking.169 In
others, it is because the behavior is covered by other state or federal rules, such as
drinking alcohol before piloting a commercial airliner.170 Finally, some courts
approve employer discrimination, but only in cases where linked directly with a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), such as fireman or cement workers
not smoking.171
A few cases, however, find simply that the employer is entitled to adhere
strictly to an employment at will regime, unless the conduct in question is
covered by a specific state statute or constitutional provision protecting it.
Typical is Stevens v. Inland Waters Inc., where a Michigan court held that an
employee fired for being a smoker was not entitled to the protection of the
Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act.172 The court held that smoking or
nicotine addiction is not a handicap with the meaning of the Act, because it does
not “substantially limit a major life activity.”173
Although these cases support a private employer’s rights to terminate
employees who drink alcohol or smoke or eat too much, the reasoning misses the
point that firms banning smoking are simply responding to a demand for
paternalism in an attempt to reduce healthcare costs. Reducing health care costs
should sufficient business reason to justify these decisions when it is given that
these employees impose large costs on other stakeholders of the firm.
Second, a few courts, especially in California and New York, hold that
certain behaviors or individual characteristics are protected handicaps that
trump background employment at will rules. In both states, for example, courts
hold that high blood pressure, without regard to cause, is a protected handicap
under state law.174 The same results obtain for obesity in a couple of states.175 For
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example, in a New York case, the court held that an overweight employee was
protected by a state antidiscrimination law that protected both correctable and
noncorrectable “diseases.”176 The court found that obesity was covered by the law
and that discrimination based solely on an individuals weight is impermissible.
These cases raise the obvious question of where one draws the line
between protected and unprotected physical ailments. Several cases, for example,
hold that diseases like AIDS and cancer are protected against the typical
employment at will regime.177
Distinguishing between behaviors or
characteristics that are susceptible to incentives should not be difficult in most
cases. The baseline in this paper uses is whether the nanny rules are inevitable,
regardless of the provider. So both governments and firms are currently trying to
reduce smoking and overeating through various measures, and thus policies
protecting these behaviors are obviously counterproductive. The same cannot be
said of various genetic diseases. There will be cases in which claims are made
about genetic predispositions to obesity or the like, but courts will be incapable of
making these judgments and thus should steer clear of attempting to fashion
policy based on arm-chair science. As discussed above, giving firms wide
discretion here—say to charge by the pound—will increase the chances of
reducing overall health care costs while preserving choice for individuals. And, if
it turns out that firms systematically overreach in ways that externalize
unavoidable costs on to society, legislatures or courts can address these abuses. A
survey of the cases suggests this has not occurred.
Third, courts occasionally invoke privacy considerations to find in favor of
employees subjected to firm nanny rules. Although employer drug testing is long
standing and widely accepted notwithstanding privacy considerations, extension
to smoking, obesity, high blood pressure, and other behavior-driven physical
conditions is more controversial. A few recent cases have allowed plaintiffs to
proceed to jury trial on claims that firm nanny policies invade employees’ privacy.
In Rodrigues v. Scotts Co., the plaintiff employee’s urine was tested and found
positive for nicotine, and so, under Scotts’s no smoking policy, he was fired.178
The district court rejected the firm’s motion to dismiss under a Massachusetts
privacy statute.179 Courts reach similar results under Pennsylvania and New York
tort law.180
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Finally, there is some precedent for courts imposing on firms an obligation
to provide alternative accommodations for employees before permitting
termination for behaviors like smoking or excessive drinking of alcohol. For
instance, in Haltom v. Southland Title of Orange County, the trial court observed
that the employer had an obligation under California law to explore reasonable
accommodations for an alcoholic employee.181 The court remanded for further
fact finding, noting that the employer has a burden to use reasonable efforts to
inform employees of disability accommodations, including alcoholism treatment.
Many firms have deployed these programs alongside hiring restrictions or cost
imposition schemes.
Meanwhile, courts interpreting lawful activity statutes have tried in some
cases to limit their reach, while using rhetoric that is expansive in the ways it
might protect employees. For example, in the only published decision analyzing
and applying the Colorado Lawful Activity, the federal court upheld the firing of
an employee who disparaged his employer in a letter to the editor of a local
newspaper, and in doing so noted that the statute “was meant to provide a shield
to employees who engage in activities that are personally distasteful to their
employer, but which activities are legal and unrelated to an employee’s job
duties”. 182 The court goes on to explain that the statute was meant to protect the
job security of: “homosexuals who would otherwise be fired by an employer who
discriminates against gay people, members of Ross Perot’s new political party
who are employed by a fervent democrat, or even smokers who are employed by
an employer with strong anti-tobacco feelings.”183
In short, the state legal landscape is highly variable, confusing, and subject
to change at any time, since states cannot credibly pre-commit to legislate or not
legislate on a particular subject. The confusing and contradictory precedents are
made even less clear by the relatively small number of cases in general and in any
particular jurisdiction. The small sample size reduces the accuracy of forecasting.
The result is significant uncertainty for firms, as well little ground to estimate the
predictability of the current legal environment. In addition, as noted above, the
variance across states means employers with employees in multiple jurisdictions
will have to adjust firm-wide policies to the most restrictive state policy on the
legality of nanny rules.
Federal law, which we turn to next, is clearer and in some cases more
permissive, but also discriminates against private provision of nanny rules.
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2004) (rejecting firing of employee who consumed a beer while off duty on company premises, and calling
the action “a substantial and highly offensive intrusion from seclusion.”).
181
Haltom v. Southland Title of Orange County, 2008 WL 4151837, Cal. App. 4 Dist. (Sept. 10,
2008).
182
Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1462-1463 (D. Col. 1997).
183
Id. (emphasis added).

The Nanny Corporation / 69
2. Federal law
Plaintiff employees invoking federal law do so under the range of federal
statutes discussed above (e.g., ERISA, ADA), as well as constitutional protections,
like the “right to privacy” or the Due Process clause. (Federal cases involve public
employers more often, such as firemen and school teachers, which means
constitutional arguments have potentially more bite.184) Federal cases are
somewhat supportive of employer attempts to force employees to internalize
their costs, but these precedents are still far from settled in that direction and,
because federal law is more often invoked against public employees, of less value
to private employers. In fact, one might recharacterize the judicial treatment of
public-employer cases as government favoritism of one of the providers of
paternalism in the market, namely, the government. Whatever the case, the
numerous federal cases do not resolve favorably enough in the direction of
employers, either public or private, to make the adoption of nanny rules a safe
bet.
There are several theories under which courts reject employer attempts to
force employees to bear the costs of their conduct. In Cook v. Rhode Island, a
morbidly obese attendant at a state-run hospital was not hired when she
reapplied for her position after a voluntary absence of some time.185 The hospital
claimed that her obesity would interfere with her ability to perform her job and
would “put her at greater risk of developing serious ailments,” which would in
turn “promote absenteeism and increase the likelihood of workers' compensation
claims.”186 Plaintiff sued under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that she suffered
from a disability and was not hired solely for that reason.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and the appeals court affirmed,
rejecting defendant’s counterarguments of mutability and voluntariness. In
affirming the jury verdict, the court opened a wide door for potential plaintiffs by
holding that not only are actual disabilities protected but also cases in which the
employer merely believes the employee is disabled within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. In other words, the employer was forced to pay hundreds of
thousands of dollars in damages, as well as litigation costs, because it, no doubt
correctly, believed that plaintiff’s weight was likely to impose costs on other
employees and the state.
184

The “state action doctrine” means actions by public employers will implicate more constitutional
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As in Cook, most cases are permitted to go to the jury in this area of law. A
challenge to the Scotts Co. employment policies discussed above is indicative.187
Scotts adopted a nicotine-free policy, both at and away from work, for its
employees. Scotts' justification for its policy “was to save money on medical
insurance costs and to promote healthy lifestyles among its employees.” The
plaintiff employee's urine was tested and found positive for nicotine, and so he
was fired. His suit survived a motion to dismiss under state law (a privacy claim)
and a claim under ERISA § 510, to wit, by terminating his employment, Scotts
interfered with his attainment of benefits and rights under Scotts' ERISA plans
that he would have become eligible for but for the termination. The court allowed
the case to go to the jury, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was
employed, if at all, for a period of only a few days. In addition, ERISA requires
that the “the loss of benefits was a mere consequence of, but not a motivating
factor behind, a termination of employment,” and that it “relates to
discriminatory conduct directed against individuals, not to actions involving the
plan in general.”188 That plaintiff’s claim survived under a statute designed to
prevent firm opportunism with respect to employee pension benefits suggests the
extent to which courts will sometimes go to prevent the deployment of nanny
rules.
In those cases in which federal courts uphold nanny rules, they often avoid
the difficult issues of privacy or discrimination by enforcing private contracts
about the behavior in question. In two unpublished opinions, circuit courts
upheld the termination of employees accused of consuming alcohol on the
ground of breaching a contractual agreement with their employer not to do so or
to complete alcohol treatment.189 This line of cases, although not strong
precedents, suggest firms should ground their nanny regulations in specific
employee contracts.
Significant uncertainty remains nevertheless, as there remain open
questions on important issues, like whether smoking, obesity, high blood
pressure, and so on are disabilities within the meaning the ADA, Rehabilitation
Act, and other federal statutes.190 To make matter worse in terms of expected
litigation costs for employers planning on using nanny rules, courts generally
emphasize using a case-by-case approach for each employee and situation.191
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C. Going Forward
This section has shown that state and federal statutes and case law create
significant uncertainty about the legality of private nanny rules, even in the
absence of state action. This bias in delivery mechanism of paternalism
demanded by individuals in common pools means that the firms will be deterred
from meeting this demand on the margin. Coupled with the disadvantages of
government entities in delivering nanny rules means that there may be
insufficient amounts of nanny rules and the ones that are produced may be
suboptimal. If the barrier to the creation of a cost-internalizing rule is higher in
the case of government rules, as is probably the case in some instances, then a
bias against firm provision of nanny rules means too few will be provided by
producers in the market for paternalism. And, if the mechanisms of
accountability, feedback, and tailoring described above are better for corporate
nannies, then the rules that are promulgated by government entities (when
corporate ones are deterred) are likely to be less efficient than if the market
playing field were level.
The case for corporate paternalism set forth above does not necessarily
obtain in all cases, so it would be premature and likely erroneous to suggest that
all of the statutes and case law described above are wrongheaded. It is equally
absurd, however, that legislatures and courts protect something like “smokers’
rights” from the discipline of the market. It is one thing to be cautious about legal
bans or taxes that might fall disproportionately on the poor, but arguments
restricting private firms from forcing individuals to internalize their costs make
no sense, especially when the government may inevitably be forced to take the
same steps. And, the existence of bans on private nannyism that exist side by side
with legal and overt state nannyism is even less defensible. The public choice
story told above may be the driver of these laws, and, if so, reason enough for
their repeal.
This does not mean, however, that all anti-discrimination provisions are
inefficient or that there is no place for some employment protections or
safeguards. Statues, like ERISA, and common-law cases enforcing vested benefits
or pensions against opportunism survive easily in this analysis. So too might laws
requiring firms to put in place safeguards—like third-party administration—that
minimize the risk of abuse by individual firms or managers. Beyond this, the law
is likely to do more harm than good unless based on a compelling theory about
the efficiency of the two different providers in the market for altruism.
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CONCLUSION
Individuals in common cost-bearing pools, such as political jurisdictions
or firms, demand paternalism to reduce subsidizing costly behavior on the part of
other individuals in the pool. Instead of viewing nannyism as necessarily the
product of irrational or rent-seeking behavior on the part of decisionmakers,
either politicians or managers, this account views them as simply responding to
the demand for paternalism by individuals. In this way, corporate regulations
banning certain individual behaviors, such as smoking, are simply a response to a
demand from firm stakeholders, such as employees and investors, to reduce firm
costs.
Viewing nannyism in this way allows one to see that firms and the
government are competitors in the delivery of cost-reducing regulations of
individual behaviors. This then allows one to examine the relative comparative
advantages and disadvantages of these competitors in the market. This paper has
shown how firms have heretofore underappreciated advantages in delivering
paternalism through nanny-type regulations. Chief among these is the constraint
provided by labor, product, and capital markets in constraining firms from
overreaching or diverting the benefits of nanny regulations away from paying the
costs imposed by the behavior in question. Firms can also write broad
prohibitions in ways that are sometimes more difficult for governments. States,
on the other hand, may have advantages both in the severity of the penalties that
can be employed (and thus less need for enforcement costs) and in covering
behaviors, such as consuming specific foods like trans fats, that may be difficult
for firms to observe.
From this, one might conclude that firms should simply provide nanny
protections when it is efficient for them to do so and likewise for the state. The
market for paternalism is unusual, however, in that the government is not only a
producer of paternalism, but also a regulator of the market for paternalism. This
paper has shown how a variety of state and federal statutes, regulations, and
judicial decisions may distort the market by limiting firm provision of efficient
nanny rules or creating sufficient uncertainty for firms to reduce innovation in
this area.
For a social policy with broad support—like reducing smoking incidence in
the population—the relevant question should be which provider of paternalism is
better on the margin at deterring the behavior. While government and firm
nannyism are not necessarily substitutes and can work together, policy makers
should be attune to how best to allocate the burden of nannying. At present, firms
are inhibited from charging smokers the full cost they impose on the firm and its
stakeholders by federal and state law. These barriers should be removed and
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allow the cost of smoking, overeating, skydiving, and so on to be set by the
market.
There will inevitably be line-drawing problems, since society can be
thought of as one big subsidy of everyone’s bad behaviors. This recharacterization
of corporate nannyism elides this objection by focusing only on those behaviors
where third-party payors inevitably are involved in trying to reduce the behavior
in question. When comparing corporate nannyism with state nannyism on these
issues—say, reducing smoking or obesity—it is clear that the former may often be
superior. This conclusion is relevant not only for the federal and state law
described above, but also for the ongoing debate about who pays for health care
in this country and how much we all pay. For example, the proposal to move
away from the employer-based health insurance model has many virtues, but this
paper points to a strong counter argument: if paternalism is inevitable for solving
some health care cost problems, firms may be the preferred and more efficient
provider.
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